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Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting:
Should Lawyers be “Privileged” to Assist
Their Clients’ Wrongdoing?
Eugene J. Schiltz*
“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal
than others.”1
The criminal law has never doubted the guilt of the driver
of the getaway car.  He can be, and often is, convicted of offenses
that were actually committed by his partners in crime.2  Or, if
his role in the criminal enterprise was limited, he might instead
be charged with what is commonly known as “aiding and abet-
ting” his cohorts in their criminal conduct.3  There is nothing
novel or troubling about the latter possibility.  To the contrary,
“[a]iding and abetting is an ancient criminal law doctrine.”4  In-
deed, for almost a century, a federal statute has provided that
those who give knowing aid to a person committing a federal
crime, with the intent of facilitating that crime, may themselves
be charged as criminal principals.5
In view of the many parallels between criminal and tort
law, one might reasonably assume that the concept of aiding
and abetting has an equally hoary pedigree on the civil side of
the legal ledger.  But it does not.  As recently as 1983, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, after scouring the books
* Adjunct Professor, The John Marshall Law School; J.D., The University of
Chicago Law School, 1981.  The author would like to thank Molly Lien, Maureen
Kordesh, Elizabeth Richert, and Martin Whittaker for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article.
1. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (New American Library 1996) (1946).
2. See, e.g., Cantrell v. State, 498 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming
driver’s conviction for armed robbery).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Gilliard, No. 06-1711, 2007 WL 2815593 (3d Cir.
Sept. 28, 2007).
4. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181
(1994). See generally United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)
(tracing the history of the crime to the fourteenth century); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Crimi-
nal Law §§ 162-76 (2008).
5. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1152, § 332 (1909).
75
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for precedent, was forced to conclude that civil liability for aid-
ing and abetting “is largely confined to isolated acts of adoles-
cents in rural society.”6  That has changed, and changed
dramatically.  In the twenty-five years since those words were
written, courts across the country have been flooded with cases
seeking to impose civil liability on persons alleged to have aided
and abetted the wrongdoing of others, and in almost every one
of those cases, they have recognized the viability of this theory
of liability.7
This torrent of litigation has, understandably, attracted the
attention of lawyers and legal commentators and triggered a
vigorous debate over both the theoretical underpinnings and
the proper contours of civil aiding and abetting liability.8  This
article is a contribution to that discussion.  It is only indirectly
6. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Central
Bank, 511 U.S. at 181-82.
7. See Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Changing the Nature of Corporate Representa-
tion: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28
ST. MARY’S L.J. 213, 239-40 (1996).  See, e.g., Dale v. Ala Acquisitions, 203 F. Supp.
2d 694, 700-01 n.5 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (listing twenty-eight states that have recog-
nized civil aiding and abetting liability since the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Halber-
stam).  Almost all of the states not listed in Dale have now recognized civil aiding
and abetting liability, at least in some context. See Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,
524 F.3d 866, 871-72 (8th Cir. 2008); Reis v. Barley, Snyder, Senft & Cohen, LLC,
484 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350-52 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat.
Ins. Co., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1189 (D. Utah 2007); Television Events & Mktg.,
Inc. v. Amcon Distrib. Co., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075-77 (D. Haw. 2006); Ellison v.
Plumbers & Steam Fitters Union Local 375, 118 P.3d 1070, 1077 (Alaska 2005);
Walls v. Moreland Altobelli Assoc., 659 S.E.2d 418, 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); High-
land Enters. v. Barker, 986 P.2d 996, 1008 (Idaho 1999); Hellums v. Raber, 853
N.E.2d 143, 146-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Cent.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Ky. 1991); Prime Fin. Servs. v. Vinton, No. 273264, 2008 WL
2262185 (Mich. Ct. App. June 3, 2008); Sloan v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 896 (Mont.
1989); Bergman ex rel. Harre v. Anderson, 411 N.W.2d 336, 339-40 (Neb. 1987);
Ward v. Bullis, 748 N.W.2d 397, 407-08 (N.D. 2008); Chem-Age Indus. v. Glover,
652 N.W.2d 756, 773-75 (S.D. 2002); Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 643-44
(Tex. 1996); Halifax Corp. v. Wachovia Bank, 604 S.E.2d 403, 411-12 (Va. 2004);
Cooper v. Cooper, 783 A.2d 430, 443 (Vt. 2001); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d
368, 377-78 (Wash. 1984).
8. See, e.g., Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS.
LAW. 1135 (May 2006); Pietrusiak, supra note 7; Taurie M. Zeitzer, In Central
Bank’s Wake, RICO’s Voice Resonates: Are Civil Aiding and Abetting Claims Still
Tenable?, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551 (1996).  The role of criminal aiding
and abetting liability has been the subject of recent debate as well. See Adam H.
Kurland, To “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce or Procure the Commission of
an Offense”: A Critique of Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. Rev.
85 (2005).
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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concerned, however, with the general principles of civil aiding
and abetting liability.  Rather, its focus is on how this theory of
liability has been, and should be, applied in suits against a par-
ticular type of defendants—lawyers themselves.9
It might further, and equally reasonably, be assumed that
the decisions in such cases would reflect the principle, articu-
lated in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers, that “a lawyer is subject to liability to a client or nonclient
when a nonlawyer would be in similar circumstances.”10  And in
a number of cases, this assumption has proved sound, as courts
have applied civil aiding and abetting principles to lawyers in
much the same way that they are applied to everyone else.11
9. I limit my focus to judicial decisions because, as far as I am aware, only one
state (California) has attempted to address the civil aiding and abetting liability of
lawyers through legislation.  I discuss that statute (briefly) below. See infra text
accompanying notes 263-79.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (reversing
dismissal of claim against lawyer under Illinois law for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty); Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin &
Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 414-15 (3d Cir. 2003) (reversing dismissal of claims
under New Jersey law against lawyers for civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting
a fraud); Albright v. Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, No. 2:03CV517, 2008 WL 2952260,
at *12 (D. Utah July 28, 2008) (granting summary judgment to attorneys alleged
to have aided and abetted a conversion); Sender v. Mann, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1175-76 (D. Colo. 2006) (recognizing viability under Colorado law of claims against
lawyers for aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty but granting
summary judgment to the lawyers on those claims); In re Ticketplanet.com, 313
B.R. 46, 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing as inadequately pled complaint
against lawyers for aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty); An-
stine v. Alexander, 128 P.3d 249, 255-56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d on other
grounds, 152 P.3d 497 (Colo. 2007) (approving aiding and abetting claim against
attorneys); Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308-09 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming
judgment for lawyers following bench trial on claim for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty); Williams Mgmt. Enters. v. Buonauro, 489 So. 2d 160, 168
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing viability of claim against attorney for aiding
and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty); Int’l Cmty. Corp. v. Young, 486 So. 2d
629, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing grant of summary judgment to attor-
ney on claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty); Thornwood, Inc. v.
Jenner & Block, 799 N.E.2d 756, 767-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (reversing dismissal of
aiding and abetting claims against lawyers); Rowen v. Le Mars Mut. Ins. Co. of
Iowa, 282 N.W.2d 639, 654-56 (Iowa 1979) (affirming judgment against lawyer for
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty); Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542,
546 (Mass. 1994) (accepting in theory claim against lawyers for aiding and abet-
ting a breach of fiduciary duty but finding complaint’s allegations inadequate);
Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 836-37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (reversing dismissal
of claim against lawyers for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty);
3
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Three recent cases, however, herald the birth of a nascent
counter-trend.12  The courts in those cases have concluded that
exposing lawyers to civil aiding and abetting liability is inap-
propriate and unwise.  Instead, they have bestowed on lawyers
special “privileges” designed to shield them from this form of
liability.  All three cases involved claims that lawyers aided and
abetted their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty, but each of the
opinions contains language reflecting judicial support for a far
more sweeping principle, one that would immunize lawyers—
and lawyers alone—from almost any civil liability for aiding
and abetting.13
These decisions are bad law and worse policy.  They cannot
be squared with the Restatement’s command that lawyers’ civil
liability should generally track that of non-lawyers.  But they
are problematic for many other reasons as well.  First, while the
courts have articulated a variety of reasons for rejecting the
civil aiding and abetting liability of lawyers, none of those rea-
sons withstand careful scrutiny.14  Arguments against such lia-
bility have also been advanced by legal commentators, but they
are no more persuasive than those articulated by the courts.15
Second, neither the courts nor the commentators appear to have
recognized that insulating lawyers, and lawyers alone, from
civil aiding and abetting liability introduces irreconcilable in-
Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward & Kissel, LLP, 849 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (App. Div.
2007) (recognizing theoretical viability of claims against lawyers for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty but finding complaint’s factual allegations in-
sufficient); Agostini v. Sobol, 757 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (App. Div. 2003) (accepting
theoretical validity of claims against lawyers but finding allegations insufficient);
Chem-Age Indus., 652 N.W.2d at 773-75 (reversing grant of summary judgment to
lawyer on claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty); Likover v. Sun-
flower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468, 472-73 (Tex. App. 1985) (affirming jury
verdict against lawyer for civil conspiracy to defraud). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. h, Reporter’s Note, § 94 cmt. g.,
Reporter’s Note (2000).
12. Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), cert. granted, 172
P.3d 1286 (N.M. 2007); Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006); Alpert v.
Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005).
13. The impact of these decisions has been substantial enough that one state
appellate court recently certified for decision to its supreme court the question of
whether attorneys can be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty
on the ground that there is now a split in authority on this issue. See Tensfeldt v.
Haberman, No. 2007AP1638, 2008 WL 889558 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2008).
14. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
15. See infra Part III.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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consistencies in the way that the law is applied in similar situa-
tions—inconsistencies that are bound to bedevil courts and
commentators in the future.16  Third, the rulings bestowing spe-
cial privileges on lawyers will surely encourage the perception
in the general public that lawyers are unfairly gaming the legal
system to provide for themselves protections that are not avail-
able to non-lawyers.  In the long run, such rulings will inevita-
bly diminish respect for the legal system as a whole.
None of these undesirable consequences are necessary.
There is plenty of room within the existing structure of aiding
and abetting law for courts to take into account the particular
role that lawyers play in our society and to reach decisions that
will not inhibit them from providing legal services by exposing
them to unwarranted civil liability for aiding and abetting.17
The essential thrust of this paper is to expose the flaws in the
catalogue of reasons that have been advanced in support of the
claim that lawyers need special protection against civil aiding
and abetting liability and, in the process, to demonstrate that
the existing principles of aiding and abetting liability provide
lawyers with all the protection they need to do their jobs prop-
erly and well.
To fully understand these issues, one needs a working un-
derstanding of the basics of civil aiding and abetting liability.
Accordingly, in the first section of this article I outline the his-
tory and structure of this form of liability.  I also describe the
general principles governing the civil liability of lawyers and
identify the cases in which courts have applied standard civil
aiding and abetting principles to lawyers.  In the second section,
I discuss in detail the three recent decisions granting lawyers
special privileges to aid and abet the wrongdoing of others and
expose the flaws in the reasons that the courts gave for reaching
those decisions.  In the third section, I explain why those deci-
sions create a number of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
way the law is applied to those in similar circumstances.  In the
fourth and final section, I show why granting lawyers special
privileges is not necessary in the first place and why even the
scenarios that are the source of the greatest concern among
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
5
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those opposed to lawyers’ aiding and abetting liability are ade-
quately addressed within the existing framework of civil aiding
and abetting law.
I. The Basic Principles of Civil Aiding and Abetting Law and
the General Law of Lawyers’ Civil Liability
A. Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability
The concept of a “joint tort” was originally conceived to
cover the situation in which two or more persons acted together
pursuant to a common tortious design.18  The idea, as a leading
authority explained it, was that if a group of “highwaymen” col-
laborated to accost a victim, it was fair to make each of them
legally responsible for anything the others did, even though
“‘one might have battered the plaintiff, while another impris-
oned him, and a third stole his silver buttons.’”19
In time, courts were called on to consider a range of varia-
tions on this theme.  There were, for example, cases in which
the relationship among the participants in wrongdoing was less
clear and others in which the role of one or more of the partici-
pants was less substantial.20  Ultimately, two distinct theories
of liability evolved: the first was the concept of civil conspiracy,
and the second came to be known as “participation” or “aiding
and abetting” liability.21  “The prime distinction between civil
conspiracies and aiding-abetting,” as the D.C. Circuit explained,
“is that a conspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a
wrongful activity.  Aiding-abetting focuses on whether a defen-
dant knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who
18. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
19. Id. at 476-77 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 46 (4th ed. 1971)).  Halberstam itself was a fascinating (and tragic) case.
Michael Halberstam was killed by Bernard Welch while Welch was robbing
Halberstam’s house. Id. at 474-76.  Halberstam’s personal representative then
sued Welch and his live-in girlfriend, Linda Hamilton. Id.  The appeal to the D.C.
Circuit was taken by Hamilton from a judgment finding her civilly responsible for
Halberstam’s death as a result of the five years that she spent living with Welch,
assisting him in disposing of the fruits of his numerous burglaries, and helping
him spend the proceeds of that criminal enterprise. Id. at 472.  The court affirmed
the judgment against Hamilton, finding itself “satisfied that the district court’s
factual findings and inferences fit into existing concepts of civil liability for con-
certed tortious actions through conspiracy and aiding-abetting.” Id. at 489.
20. Id. at 477.
21. Id. at 476-77.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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performed wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant
agreed to join the wrongful conduct.”22  This distinction is well-
settled, at least conceptually, as these theories of liability have
been reflected in sections 876 (a) and (b) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts since 1939.23
At least a half-dozen other sections of three Restatements
provide conceptual support for the theories of joint liability re-
flected in section 876.  The most direct support is found in two
provisions linking those theories to breaches of fiduciary duty.
A comment to section 874 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
refers specifically to section 876 and provides that “[a] person
who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of
trust is himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to liabil-
ity for the harm thereby caused.”24  Along the same lines, sec-
tion 326 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that
“[a] third person who, although not a transferee of trust prop-
erty, has notice that the trustee is committing a breach of trust
and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for any loss
caused by the breach of trust.”25
Several sections of the Restatement (Second) of Agency pro-
vide more generic support.  A comment to section 343 of that
Restatement also references section 876 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and provides that “[a]n agent who assists an-
other agent or the principal to commit a tort is normally himself
22. Id. at 478. See also Neilson v. Union Bank of California, 290 F. Supp. 2d
1101, 1133-35 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 229-32.
23. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 476-77.  Section 876 provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other
or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial as-
sistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).  While there are many decisions
citing sections (a) and (b), the theory of liability set forth in section (c) has been
something of a dead letter, presumably because when the defendant’s conduct vio-
lates a direct duty, it is easier and more advantageous for the plaintiff to sue for
that violation.  Whatever the reason, published decisions citing section 876(c) are
few and far between. But see Gervais v. Foehrenbach, 181 A.2d 253 (Conn. 1962);
Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 602 A.2d 324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. c (1979).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959).
7
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liable as a joint tort feasor for the entire damage.”26  In a some-
what narrower vein, the Restatement (Second) of Agency adds
that “[a] person who, without being privileged to do so, inten-
tionally causes or assists an agent to violate a duty to his princi-
pal is subject to liability to the principal”27 and that “[a]n agent
who fraudulently makes representations, uses duress, or know-
ingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud or duress by his
principal or by others is subject to liability in tort to the injured
person although the fraud or duress occurs in a transaction on
behalf of the principal.”28  Other sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency provide further, but less direct, conceptual
support for civil aiding and abetting liability.29
Courts and commentators have often blurred the line be-
tween the distinct theories of liability reflected in section 876.30
Problems have resulted from differences in the way the theories
are applied in the civil context and their criminal counter-
parts.31  Confusion has also arisen because the courts, perhaps
reluctant to impose liability on the basis of mere “assistance,”
have at times stretched the facts of a case to infer an “agree-
ment” to participate in tortious conduct when there really was
none.32  Forcing a “substantial assistance” case into the “civil
conspiracy” mold just creates a different problem anyway, as
the latter concept is no model of legal clarity.33
For present purposes, however, the more significant point
is that, as late as 1983, aiding and abetting was a neglected
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 cmt. d (1958).
27. Id. § 312.
28. Id. § 348.
29. See id. §§ 257, 344; Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 231 n.57.
30. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
31. See, e.g., Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus,
P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 415 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that, in New Jersey, shared in-
tent is required to impose criminal, but not civil, aiding and abetting liability);
Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Law-
yers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 84 n.33 (1993); Jerry
Whitson, Civil Conspiracy: A Substantive Tort?, 59 B.U. L. REV. 921, 921-27
(1979); Zeitzer, supra note 8, at 560-62.
32. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 478.
33. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 732 (1966) (“The tort of
‘conspiracy’ is poorly defined, and highly susceptible to judicial expansion; its rela-
tively brief history is colored by use as a weapon against the developing labor
movement.”).  For a discussion of the history of civil conspiracy, see Whitson, supra
note 31.
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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theory of civil liability.34  Likely as a result of its lack of use, it
had been recognized only in an odd patchwork of cases.  The
first group, as the D.C. Circuit noted, was a scattering of tort
cases arising out of the “isolated acts of adolescents in rural so-
ciety.”35  Another was the limited employment of the concept of
civil conspiracy, mostly in the labor law arena.36
A third area was the law of securities fraud, where aiding
and abetting actually became an important form of liability.37
This particular use of civil aiding and abetting liability was sub-
stantially curtailed in 1994, however, when the Supreme Court,
in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,38
held that it was not authorized by section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.39  Congress restored aiding and abetting
liability to section 10(b), but only in cases brought by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission.40  Private securities plaintiffs
adapted to the Central Bank decision by making a greater effort
to establish that alleged wrongdoers are primary violators,
rather than aiders and abettors, and by making more use of
34. By now, the careful reader will have noticed that, beginning with the title
to this article, I have used the shorthand reference “aiding and abetting” to de-
scribe what are really three distinct, albeit closely-related, types of liability, even
though that name properly belongs to just one of them.  One could—and some
have—criticized such sloppiness. See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 84 n.33 (sug-
gesting that in light of the inexact parallel between the civil and criminal law,
“[m]uch confusion could have been avoided if the SEC and the early courts used
the phrase ‘substantial assistance’ in naming the doctrine rather than ‘aiding and
abetting.’”).  Nevertheless, for two reasons I have decided to sacrifice linguistic
precision for ease of understanding.  Imprecise though it is, “aiding and abetting”
is the phrase that is almost always employed by courts and commentators to de-
scribe this general form of liability.  Moreover, the terminology issue is substan-
tively important only in distinguishing among the three theories of liability
articulated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979), and that is not my
focus here.  So, other than in a couple of places in which I discuss separately the
ways this theory of liability is applied to lawyers, I shall employ the familiar short-
hand reference “aiding and abetting” to describe collectively all of the theories of
liability reflected in section 876.
35. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 489.
36. See United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 732.
37. See generally William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal
Securities Laws—Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and
Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313
(1989).
38. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
39. See id. at 191.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (1995). See also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 768-69 (2008).
9
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other sections of the securities laws.41  In addition, and of more
direct relevance here, they put more emphasis on claims of aid-
ing and abetting common law fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty, which were unaffected by the decision in Central Bank.42
A fourth traditional use of civil aiding and abetting liability
was in the law of trusts.  The Supreme Court recently observed
“that ‘knowing participation’ liability on the part of both co-
trustees and third persons was well established under the com-
mon law of trusts.”43  In fact, this principle was so firmly
established that, almost a century ago, Professor Austin Wake-
man Scott was able to begin an article in the Harvard Law Re-
view with the pronouncement that “[a]nyone who participates
with a trustee in a breach of trust may be held liable in a court
of equity to the cestui que trust.”44  Indeed, the common law has
historically been so protective of trust beneficiaries that the lia-
bility of those who participate in a breach of trust approaches
strict liability.45
Thus, in the early 1980s, the basic contours of aiding and
abetting law were rather peculiar.  On the criminal side of the
law, the concept had been recognized and applied for centuries.
On the civil side, the concept certainly existed in theory, as it
was reflected in a number of sections of the Restatements of
Torts, Trusts, and Agency.  In practice, however, its use was
most prominent in two substantive areas—securities regulation
and labor law—in which common law theories of civil liability
had been largely usurped by federal statutory regulation.  In
non-statutory cases, the doctrine was largely confined to cases
alleging a breach of trust and a handful of tort cases with mini-
mal relevance to modern commercial society.
41. See, e.g., In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 498-503 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (discussing these developments).
42. See, e.g., YF Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. CV 07-567-PHX-MHM,
2008 WL 821856 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2008).
43. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993) (citations omitted).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959).
44. Austin Wakeman Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 454, 454 (1921).
45. Peter T. Wendel, The Evolution of the Law of Trustee’s Powers and Third
Party Liability for Participating in a Breach of Trust: An Economic Analysis, 35
SETON HALL L. REV. 971, 972 (2005).
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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The flood of civil aiding and abetting cases in the last quar-
ter century has, therefore, forced the courts to confront many
issues that they are now working through.  For example, there
is considerable disagreement as to whether substantial assis-
tance and civil conspiracy are torts in and of themselves or just
forms of vicarious liability.46  There are also questions about the
nature of the distinction between the two theories and how and
where to draw a line between them.47
While these issues have some relevance here, they are not
the principal focus of this article, because they affect all civil
aiding and abetting claims, not just those filed against lawyers.
Questions about how to distinguish among the types of aiding
and abetting liability, whether they are independent torts or
just forms of vicarious liability, or even whether there ought to
be civil aiding and abetting liability in the first place, are inde-
pendent of the question whether, if such liability exists, lawyers
should be exposed to it in the same manner as everyone else.
Before turning to this question, however, it will be helpful to
sketch briefly the history of lawyers’ civil liability.
B. The General Law of Lawyers’ Civil Liability
It was not too long ago that almost nobody had the temerity
to sue a lawyer.  In the preface to the 2008 edition of their lead-
ing treatise on the liability of lawyers, Ronald Mallen and Jef-
frey Smith observe that the first edition of the treatise,
published in 1977, “examined about 800 decisions, most of
which did not involve claims for legal malpractice but concerned
ethics or professional responsibility issues.”48  The 2008 edition,
by contrast, “examines over 17,000 decisions.”49  The recent ex-
plosion of civil litigation against lawyers therefore parallels al-
most exactly the explosion of civil aiding and abetting cases.
46. See Eastern Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc., 229 F.3d 617, 623-24 (7th Cir.
2000); Neilson v. Union Bank of California, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1133-35 (C.D.
Cal. 2003); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & ROBERT E. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS 324 (5th
ed. 2001); Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 241; Whitson, supra note 31.
47. Even though criminal aiding and abetting is far more firmly established
than its civil counterpart, its proper contours are no less the subject of debate. See,
e.g., Kurland, supra note 8.
48. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE ix (2008).
49. Id.
11
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There are, of course, different ways in which one might cat-
egorize the suits that are filed against lawyers, but the most
basic distinction is between those filed by clients and those filed
by non-clients.  Clients have long had the right to sue their law-
yers for wrongdoing in connection with the representation, even
if that right was, until recently, rarely exercised.  These suits
traditionally were styled in tort as claims for legal malpractice,
but they often included claims for breach of contract or fiduciary
duty.50  There is substantial overlap among these theories, and
the courts have had some difficulty deciding which ones to ap-
ply to particular types of lawyer misconduct.51  The cause of ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty has been particularly
controversial, as courts have wrestled with the argument that
such claims simply—and therefore unnecessarily—duplicate le-
gal malpractice claims.52
These difficulties, however, pale beside those that have con-
fronted the courts in their struggle to delineate the contours of
lawyers’ liability to non-clients.  In 1880, the Supreme Court
held that lawyers had no liability to anyone other than their
clients for professional negligence,53 and well into the second
half of the twentieth century, this privity-based bar operated to
completely preclude almost all civil suits against lawyers by
non-clients.  The only exceptions were a few theories of liability
that were available to non-clients in limited situations.  For in-
stance, lawyers have always been exposed to suits for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process, though such claims have gen-
erally met little success.54  In addition, lawyers could always be
sued when they committed ordinary torts—most commonly
fraud,55 but occasionally others as well.56  And lawyers have,
50. Roy R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Con-
tract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235, 235 (1994).
51. Id. at 235-37. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERS § 49 cmt. c (2000) (“Many claims brought by clients against lawyers can rea-
sonably be classified either as for breach of fiduciary-duty or for negligence
without any difference in result.”).
52. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach
as Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 695-700 (2006).
53. Nat’l Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1880).
54. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, §§ 6.8-6.24; J. Randolph Evans & Ida
Patterson Dorvee, Attorney Liability for Assisting Clients with Wrongful Conduct:
Established and Emerging Bases of Liability, 45 S.C. L. REV. 803, 805-09 (1994).
55. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, § 6.7.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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from time to time, been subject to suits for certain statutory vio-
lations, most notably claims brought under the securities
laws.57  For a long while, that was about the extent of lawyers’
(largely theoretical) civil liability to non-clients.
But as the privity bar began to break down in other areas of
the law, so too did it begin to crumble in suits against lawyers.58
In a development generally traced to the California Supreme
Court’s decisions in Biakanja v. Irving59 and Lucas v. Hamm,60
courts began to hold that non-clients could bring routine mal-
practice suits against lawyers using one of two theories.  The
first class of cases were those in which the non-client could
show that he or she was an intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s
services, with suits brought by persons who lost an inheritance
due to a lawyer’s alleged negligence in drafting or probating a
will being the paradigm.61  Courts also began to approve law-
yers’ liability to non-clients when it could be shown that a law-
yer had voluntarily assumed duties to non-clients knowing that
they were likely relying on his or her services, such as transac-
tions in which a lawyer issued an opinion letter.62
The recognition in the legal community that lawyers are
vulnerable to being sued civilly got a big boost in the fallout
from the savings and loan crisis in the late 1980s and early
1990s.  After being forced to take over a number of failed sav-
ings and loans, federal regulators filed a series of well-publi-
56. Id. §§ 6.25-6.30.
57. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495-97 (4th Cir. 1991); Wenneman v.
Brown, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (D. Utah 1999). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmts. i & j (2000); MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 48, § 13.20; Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability for Client Fraud, 1991
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1991); Lora C. Siegler, Annotation, Attorney’s Liabil-
ity for Nondisclosure or Misrepresentation to Third-party Nonclients in Private
Civil Actions Under Federal Securities Laws, 112 A.L.R. FED. 141 (1993).
58. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, § 6.1 (In 2008, “[n]onclients bring over
20% of all claims against attorneys that arise out of the rendition of legal ser-
vices.”) (footnote omitted).
59. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
60. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961).
61. See generally Langevoort, supra note 31, at 89-90; Robert W. Tuttle, The
Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 889, 903-04 (1994); John Teshima, Annotation, Attorney’s Liability, to One
Other than Immediate Client, for Negligence in Connection with Legal Duties, 61
A.L.R. 4TH 615 (1988).
62. Teshima, supra note 61, § 14(a).
13
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cized suits in an effort to recoup the losses suffered by the
S&Ls.  Those suits often included claims against the outside
lawyers for the entities—claims that attracted considerable at-
tention (and no little consternation) in the legal community for
the aggressiveness and creativity of the government’s efforts to
impose on lawyers liability for the conduct of the business
executives.63
In framing its arguments in those cases, the government
often alleged that the lawyers had “aided and abetted” breaches
of fiduciary duty committed by the officers and directors, termi-
nology that was then mimicked by the courts and the media.64
There is, however, a fundamental difference between those
claims and the aiding and abetting claims that are the focus of
this article.  Because the government had stepped into the
shoes of the savings and loans, and filed suit in its capacity as
receiver, it was effectively suing the lawyers as their client.65
Accordingly, those suits are conceptually distinct from the
claims which are the focus of this article—claims in which non-
client third parties charge lawyers with aiding and abetting
wrongdoing by the lawyers’ clients.
C. Aiding and Abetting Cases Against Lawyers
It was inevitable that the parallel explosions of civil aiding
and abetting lawsuits and civil suits filed against lawyers
would intersect, and the law anticipated this development.  Sec-
tion 94 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers expressly contemplates civil aiding and abetting claims
against lawyers and directs that they be handled under sections
63. See generally Evans & Dorvee, supra note 54, at 804; Christopher G. Sab-
lich, Duties of Attorneys Advising Financial Institutions in the Wake of the S&L
Crisis, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 517 (1992).
64. See, e.g., FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888, 896 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (“The
complaint alleges that the attorney Defendants knowingly aided [the savings and
loan’s executives] in breaching their fiduciary duties by structuring, documenting,
and closing fraudulent loans and failed to warn any nonculpable party of the ille-
gal transactions.”).
65. Evans & Dorvee, supra note 54, at 823-35.  In some cases, the government
also alleged that the lawyers breached independent duties to the government or
the taxpayers. See Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 245-54.  Those claims were not
aiding and abetting claims at all.
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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51, 56 and 57 of that Restatement.66  Section 56 (the section ref-
erenced at the outset of this article) in turn articulates the gen-
eral command that lawyers’ liability should track that of non-
lawyers, and its official comments cross-reference both section
876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts67 and section 326 of
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.68  Nothing in the text of
any of these sections, or in their official comments, suggests
that lawyers are meant to receive special immunity against aid-
ing and abetting claims.
At least initially, the courts saw things the same way.
There are, for example, plenty of cases in which courts upheld
the viability of claims charging lawyers with participating in a
fraud.69  It also seems to have always been accepted that law-
yers could be sued for assisting a breach of trust; in his treatise,
Professor Scott observed that attorneys are liable to the benefi-
ciaries of the trust in such cases on the same terms as anyone
else.70  The courts agreed, and there are a fair number of cases
holding lawyers liable for aiding and abetting a breach of
trust.71  More recently, a handful of courts have also recognized
that lawyers can also be sued for aiding and abetting their cli-
ents’ breaches of fiduciary duty not involving trusts.72  Perhaps
the leading case of this type, and certainly a representative ex-
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(l)(a)
(2000) (“A lawyer who counsels or assists a client to engage in conduct that violates
the rights of a third person is subject to liability . . . to the third person to the
extent stated in §§ 51 and 56-57 . . . .”).
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. c.
68. Id. § 56 cmt. h.
69. See, e.g., id. § 56, cmt. f, Reporter’s Note.
70. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 326.4, at 310 (4th ed. 1989) (“If a trustee in the administration of the
trust employs an attorney or other agent, and the trustee commits a breach of
trust, the agent is not under a liability to the beneficiaries of the trust for partici-
pation in the trust, unless he knew or should have known that he was assisting the
trustee to commit a breach of trust.  Even if he knows or has reason to know that
the trustee is committing a breach of trust, he is not liable unless he assists the
trustee in such a way that he as well as the trustee should be held responsible for
the breach of trust.”) (footnote omitted). See also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 901 (2d ed. 1995).
71. See, e.g., Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1082-83 (7th Cir. 1982); SCOTT
& FRATCHER, supra note 70, § 326.4 (collecting cases).
72. See cases cited supra note 11.
15
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ample of the genre, is the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in
Granewich v. Harding.73
William R. Granewich II, Ben Harding, and Jeannie Alex-
ander-Hergert each owned one-third of the stock in Founders
Funding Group, Inc. (“FFG”) and were officers, directors and
employees of the company.74  As often happens in close corpora-
tions, a schism developed, leading two of the principals (Har-
ding and Alexander-Hergert) to try and force the third
(Granewich) out of the business.75  After informing Granewich
that he had been ousted as a director, Harding and Alexander-
Hergert relieved him of his executive position and fired him as
an employee.76  When Granewich protested that the scheme to
force him out was a breach of the fiduciary duties that Harding
and Alexander-Hergert owed him as fellow shareholders and di-
rectors, Harding and Alexander-Hergert hired Michael J. Far-
rell, of the law firm Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Langslet &
Hoffman, ostensibly to represent the corporation’s interest in
the dispute.77
Granewich then sued Harding and Alexander-Hergert for
breach of fiduciary duty and Farrell and his firm for aiding and
abetting that breach.78  He alleged that the lawyers had as-
sisted Harding and Alexander-Hergert in their scheme to oust
him from the corporation by sending him letters containing
false statements about the legal effect of the efforts to remove
him.79  The lawyers were also alleged to have furthered those
efforts “by calling special meetings, amending corporate by-
laws, removing plaintiff as a director, and taking other actions
to dilute the value of plaintiff’s FFG stock.”80  Granewich al-
leged that Farrell and his firm did all of this even though FFG
had no legitimate interest in resolving the dispute in a way that
would benefit two of its principals at the expense of the third.81
73. 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999).
74. Id. at 791.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.  This fact would become important down the road. See infra text ac-
companying note 93.
78. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 791.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 791-92.
81. Id.
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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Granewich settled with Harding and Alexander-Hergert,
leaving Oregon’s appellate courts to consider only his claims
against Farrell and the Martin law firm.82  The Oregon Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of those claims,
holding essentially that the lawyers had no liability to
Granewich because they did not represent him and therefore
owed him no direct fiduciary duty.83
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.84  The court began its
analysis by adopting the basic theory of liability contained in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, holding that “persons acting
in concert may be liable jointly for one another’s torts under any
one of the three theories identified in Restatement section
876.”85  The fact that Granewich’s claim was for participation in
a breach of fiduciary duty posed no problem, because the legal
authorities “virtually are unanimous in expressing the proposi-
tion that one who knowingly aids another in the breach of a fi-
duciary duty is liable to the one harmed thereby.”86  “Indeed,”
the court observed, “it especially would be odd for the law to
afford beneficiaries of fiduciary relationships less protection
from the malfeasance of third parties than would be available to
the victims of other kinds of tortious conduct.”87  Besides, the
court held, the principle of liability for participation in a breach
of fiduciary duty “readily extends to lawyers.”88
The Oregon Court of Appeals had concluded that a lawyer
cannot be liable to a non-client in a case like Granewich, “be-
cause the tort of breach of a fiduciary duty depends on a duty
that the law implies from a fiduciary relationship between the
parties, [and] it necessarily follows that a fiduciary relationship
must exist between the plaintiff and all joint tortfeasors.”89  The
Oregon Supreme Court rejected this reasoning as “erroneously
fus[ing] together” the liability established by subsection 876(c)
of the Restatement, which applies to those whose “own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
82. Id. at 790.
83. Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
84. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 796.
85. Id. at 793 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
86. Id. at 793-94.
87. Id. at 794.
88. Id. (footnote omitted).
89. Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1071 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
17
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person,” and section 876(a), which imposes liability on persons
whose actions were not independently wrongful.90  Under sec-
tion 876(a), the court recognized, liability can be imposed even
on those who did not themselves commit a tort.91
The Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged the Court of Ap-
peals’ concern that “it unduly would interfere with lawyer-client
relations if lawyers could be held liable for actions performed on
behalf of their clients that only indirectly result in their clients’
breach of their fiduciary duties.”92  This concern was not impli-
cated, the court concluded, because Farrell and his firm repre-
sented only the corporation, and it had no interest in which of
its shareholders came out on top in their internecine dispute.
Accordingly, “the lawyers stand in no different position in rela-
tion to plaintiff than anyone else, and their status as lawyers is
irrelevant.”93
Granewich was an undeniable victory for the principle that
lawyers have the same aiding and abetting liability as anyone
else.  At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals’ ruling
that Granewich overturned marked an undercurrent of discon-
tent with that premise which had begun to percolate in the legal
community.  At about the same time, for example, the South
Dakota Supreme Court stated that “[h]olding attorneys liable
for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty in rendering
professional services poses both a hazard and a quandary for
the legal profession. . . . [O]verbroad liability might diminish
the quality of legal services, since it would impose ‘self-protec-
tive reservations’ in the attorney-client relationship.”94  Not-
withstanding this concern, the court did not find it necessary to
reject such claims; lawyers would be adequately protected, it
90. Granewich, 985 P.2d at 794.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 795.
93. Id.  To this statement, the court appended a footnote that would become
important seven years later: “We do not suggest, by drawing this distinction,” the
court cautioned, “that it necessarily matters that the corporation, rather than Har-
ding and Alexander-Hergert, was the client.  We note only that, on these allega-
tions, the dilemma posed by the Court of Appeals is not presented.” Id. at 795 n.7.
See infra Part II.A.
94. Chem-Age Indus. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d 756, 774 (S.D. 2002) (quoting
Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737, 743 (Cal. 1976)).
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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concluded, if “courts strictly interpret[ed] the common law ele-
ments of aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty.”95
Arguments against imposing civil aiding and abetting lia-
bility on lawyers also began to appear in legal publications.96
One commentator criticized the Oregon Supreme Court’s ruling
in Granewich, albeit more because of the potential burdens that
it placed on attorneys called on to advise the shareholders of
close corporations on how to resolve disagreements with one an-
other than because of its application of civil aiding and abetting
principles to lawyers.97  The growing undercurrent of discontent
would ultimately manifest itself in the decisions that are the
focus of this article.
II. The Cases Rejecting Lawyers’ Civil Liability for Aiding
and Abetting
A. Reynolds v. Schrock
Seven years after it decided Granewich, the Oregon Su-
preme Court sharply reversed course.  In Reynolds v. Schrock,98
the court held that lawyers have a “qualified privilege” to aid
and abet their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty.99  In fact, as
will become clear, the privilege that the court announced in
Reynolds is anything but “qualified,” as it appears to leave law-
yers completely free to provide almost any help their clients
need in order to breach their fiduciary duties.
95. Id. (citing Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 186-
87 (Minn. 1999)).
96. See, e.g., Bryan C. Barksdale, Redefining Obligations in Close Corporation
Fiduciary Representation: Attorney Liability for Aiding and Abetting the Breach of
Fiduciary Duty in Squeeze-Outs, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 551 (2001); Katerina P.
Lewinbuk, Let’s Sue all the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims against Lawyers for Aid-
ing and Abetting a Client’s Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 141
(2008) (labeling the theory of civil aiding and abetting against lawyers as “alarm-
ing to the legal profession”); Jessica Palvino, Aiding-and-Abetting Liability: Is
Privity Making a Comeback?, 70 TEX. B. J. 52, 53 (2007) (criticizing aiding and
abetting cases because a lawyer “should not be held liable merely for doing his
job”); Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 216 (labeling aiding and abetting as an “ominous
new form of attorney liability”); Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability For Aiding
and Abetting Clients’ Misconduct Under State Law, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 130, 131
(2008) (warning that aiding and abetting liability “risks diminishing the quality of
legal services”); Tuttle, supra note 61.
97. Barksdale, supra note 9, at 554.
98. 142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006).
99. Id. at 1071.
19
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Clyde Reynolds was a naturopathic physician and Donna
Schrock was one of his patients.100  Together, doctor and patient
bought two parcels of land.  After their relationship fell apart,
Schrock sued Reynolds to settle title to the land.101  Assisted by
their lawyers, the parties negotiated a settlement.102  The set-
tlement agreement (drafted by the lawyers) provided that Reyn-
olds would transfer his interest in one parcel (the “lodge
property”) to Schrock, and that they would jointly sell the sec-
ond parcel (the “timber property”), with its proceeds going to
Reynolds.103  They agreed that if the timber property sold for
less than $500,000, Schrock would pay Reynolds the difference,
and that she would give him a security interest in the lodge
property to secure that payment.104  If the timber property sold
for more than $500,000, Schrock would owe Reynolds nothing
further.105
Schrock’s lawyer, Charles Markley, then advised her that
the settlement agreement did not require her to retain the lodge
property in order to secure the payment to Reynolds, and he
helped her quietly sell that property.106  He also advised her
that she was free to revoke her consent to the joint sale of the
timber property, and he helped her do that, too.107  Not surpris-
ingly, Reynolds was upset when he learned of these actions and
he sued Schrock and Markley.108  He alleged that he and
Schrock had been joint venturers, and therefore fiduciaries of
one another, and that they retained that status during the
winding-up of the joint venture.109  He claimed that Markley
had given Schrock “substantial assistance and encouragement”
in her breach of fiduciary duty or, alternatively, that he had ac-
ted “in concert with [her] pursuant to a common design.”110
Like Granewich, Reynolds settled with the primary wrong-
doer (Schrock), leaving Oregon’s appellate courts to consider
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only the claims against the lawyer charged with participating in
the breach of fiduciary duty (Markley).111  The trial court
granted Markley summary judgment, but the Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed.112  Because Markley’s advice and assistance
had unquestionably been rendered to a client, the court recog-
nized that it had to confront the question that the Oregon Su-
preme Court had left open in Granewich—whether a lawyer can
be held liable for aiding and abetting his own client’s breach of
fiduciary duty.113
Though it feared that its decision would have “serious im-
plications for attorneys,” the Court of Appeals reluctantly con-
cluded that lawyers can be held liable to the injured third party
in this situation.114  It expressed concern that such liability
could undermine the attorney-client relationship by requiring
attorneys to monitor their clients’ conduct to prevent them from
using the lawyer’s advice to guide a breach of fiduciary duty and
worried that attorneys facing such liability might need to dis-
close confidential communications in order to defend them-
selves in a lawsuit.115  These undesirable consequences could be
adequately mitigated, the court nevertheless concluded, by
strictly interpreting the elements of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, such as the requirement that liability be imposed only in
cases of “substantial” assistance or encouragement of a tortious
act.116
Markley appealed, and the Oregon Supreme Court re-
versed.117  The court began its analysis with its decision in
Granewich, which it characterized as “a reasonable starting
point because it involved claims for breach of fiduciary duty, in-
cluding a claim against a lawyer for assisting others in breach-
ing fiduciary duties that they owed to the plaintiff.”118
Granewich did establish, the court recognized, that section 876
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts set the basic framework
for analyzing such cases.  Nevertheless, it continued:
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Reynolds v. Schrock, 107 P.3d 52, 57 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
114. Id. at 58.
115. Id. at 59.
116. Id.
117. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1072.
118. Id. at 1065.
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Granewich does not provide a complete answer to the
questions that this case raises. . . .
. . . [because in that case] this court did not con-
sider or answer the question that is at the core of this
case: whether, and under what circumstances, a third
party may assert a claim against a lawyer, acting in a
professional capacity, for assisting a client in breach-
ing the client’s fiduciary duty.119
As the Oregon Supreme Court framed it, therefore, the issue in
Reynolds was whether conduct that would expose a lawyer to
liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by a
non-client would become permissible if the breaching party was
the lawyer’s client.120
Citing section 890 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
court noted that “[t]he Restatement labels any such exemption
from liability that the law otherwise would impose as a ‘privi-
lege.’”121  After acknowledging that it had never before consid-
ered what kind of “privilege” might protect a lawyer from
liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, the
court found support for one in a line of cases holding that agents
are in some circumstances “privileged” to advise persons or en-
tities to breach their contracts.122  Although none of the Oregon
cases of this type had involved lawyers, the court noted that
courts in other states had applied this rule to lawyers.123
The Oregon Supreme Court teased out of these cases the
principle that “for individuals and corporations to obtain the ad-
vice and assistance that they must receive from their agents,
the agents must have some protection from tort liability to third
parties . . . .”124  It leavened this principle with a caution that
the protection was not without limits: “Not every relationship
between a person who breaches a contract or a fiduciary duty
and one who substantially assists in such a breach necessarily
justifies recognition of a privilege against liability.”125  “How-
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1069-71.
121. Id. at 1066 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1979)).
122. Id. at 1067-68.
123. Id. at 1068 n.11.
124. Id. at 1068.
125. Id.
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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ever,” the court concluded, “we think that the lawyer-client rela-
tionship is one that does.”126
The court then identified three policy justifications in sup-
port of its ruling.  First, it asserted that “safeguarding the law-
yer-client relationship protects more than just an individual or
entity in any particular case or transaction; it is integral to the
protection of the legal system itself.”127  This is so, the court con-
tinued, because:
Myriad business transactions, as well as civil, crimi-
nal, and administrative proceedings, require that the
client have the assistance of a lawyer.  And a variety of
doctrines, from the rules against conflicts of interest to
the confidential nature of lawyer-client communica-
tions, demonstrate the ways in which the legal system
protects the lawyer-client relationship.128
Second, the court believed that “[a] lawyer who is sued for sub-
stantially assisting a client’s breach of fiduciary duty becomes
subject to divided loyalties.”129  Finally, echoing the Court of Ap-
peals’ concern, the court noted that “allowing a claim against
the lawyer may raise issues of lawyer-client privilege, if the
preparation of an adequate defense for the lawyer would re-
quire the disclosure of privileged communications.”130
On the basis of these observations, the court announced a
rule that “a lawyer acting on behalf of a client and within the
scope of the lawyer-client relationship is protected by . . . a priv-
ilege and is not liable for assisting the client in conduct that
breaches the client’s fiduciary duty to a third party.”131  It then
went on to clarify and emphasize two features of its new rule.
First, it placed the burden of establishing that the lawyer was
acting outside the scope of the lawyer-client relationship on the
plaintiff.132  Second, it stressed that the rule protects only per-
missible lawyer activities and not conduct unrelated to the pro-





130. Id. at 1069.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1071.
133. Id. at 1069.
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by definition, outside the scope of the lawyer-client relationship,
no important public interest would be served by extending the
qualified privilege to cover it.”134
Its holding, the court asserted, was consistent with rulings
in which other courts had limited the scope of lawyers’ aiding
and abetting liability, albeit by strictly interpreting the ele-
ments of aiding and abetting rather than establishing a privi-
lege to aid and abet.135  The court suggested that its rule would
often lead to the same result that other courts would reach
within the established framework, but that it would do so:
[I]n a more predictable and useful way, because it fo-
cuses on the scope of the lawyer-client relationship—
and the legal rules . . . that help define that scope—
rather than on the fine line between “advice” and “as-
sistance” or between “substantial assistance” and
other assistance.  We acknowledge that the test does
not identify a bright line between liability and immu-
nity, but it nevertheless uses concepts tied directly to
the lawyer’s role in representing the client and ex-
isting sources of law regarding the scope of that
role.136
Applying its new rule did not take long.  The court quickly
concluded that Markley’s conduct had been within the scope of
his lawyer-client relationship with Schrock, and that he was
therefore entitled “to assess [her] legal problems . . . [and] dis-
cuss the full range of available solutions.”137  He was also enti-
tled “to assist [her] in implementing those solutions, to the
extent that that assistance falls within the legitimate scope of
the lawyer-client relationship.”138  Accordingly, the court held,
the trial court had correctly granted Markley’s motion for sum-
mary judgment, and the Court of Appeals had erred in revers-
ing that ruling.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1070.
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1. The Flaws in the Reynolds Court’s Arguments
Against Aiding and Abetting Liability for
Lawyers
There are deep flaws in each of the reasons that the Reyn-
olds court gave for granting lawyers a special “privilege” to aid
and abet their clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty.
i. The Inapt Analogy to Tortious Interference Cases
In Granewich, the Oregon Supreme Court had held that lia-
bility may be imposed on those who substantially assist a
breach of fiduciary duty, and in Reynolds, the court framed the
issue as whether that rule should not apply when the assistance
was being provided by a lawyer to a client.  Thus, it was per-
fectly natural for the court to begin its analysis in the latter
case with section 890 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which “labels any such exemption from liability that the law
otherwise would impose as a ‘privilege.’”139
Because it had not previously considered what “privileges”
might be available to those who assist others in a breach of fidu-
ciary duty, the court had to look elsewhere for guidance.  It
found some in cases granting advisors and other agents, includ-
ing lawyers, a “privilege” to advise their principals to breach a
contract.140  The court found these cases instructive because
“they involve claims against a person for actions on behalf of a
client or principal that allegedly harmed a third party.”141
What the court overlooked in drawing this analogy is that the
law views the “harm” that flows from a breach of contract far
differently than it does the “harm” that arises from a breach of
fiduciary duty.  As one court succinctly put it, “a breach of con-
tract is not considered wrongful activity in the sense that a tort
or a crime is wrongful.”142
139. Id. at 1066.
140. Id. at 1067.
141. Id.
142. Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d
385, 389 (7th Cir. 2002). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16,
introductory note (1981) (discussing remedies); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at
the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering,
104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550, 1559-60 (1995). But see id. at 1562, 1565-66 (construct-
ing an argument that torts and most other civil wrongs are not sufficiently differ-
ent from breaches of contract to support a meaningful distinction in this context).
25
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This difference underlies the difficulties that courts and
commentators have faced when they have attempted to deline-
ate the liability of those who induce others to breach their con-
tracts.143  These difficulties are reflected in section 766 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with
the performance of a contract (except a contract to
marry) between another and a third person by induc-
ing or otherwise causing the third person not to per-
form the contract, is subject to liability to the other for
the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the fail-
ure of the third person to perform the contract.144
The key to the operation of the tort lies in the context given
to the word “improperly.”  For guidance in this endeavor, the
Restatement directs courts to consider the seven factors listed
in section 767.145  While those factors are often labeled “privi-
leges”—indeed, the Restatement itself uses this terminol-
ogy146—the drafters also caution:
[T]his branch of tort law has not developed a crystal-
lized set of definite rules as to the existence or non-
existence of a privilege to act in the manner stated in
§§ 766, 766A or 766B.  Because of this fact, [section
767] is expressed in terms of whether the interference
is improper or not, rather than whether there was a
privilege to act in the manner specified.147
Thus, the analysis called for by section 767 is fact-specific, and
courts faced with tortious interference claims must attempt to
balance a number of competing interests as well as accommo-
date the different policies that underlie tort and contract law.
The “privilege” that protects those who advise or assist others to
breach a contract is, necessarily, equally contextual, suggesting
that it is not easily exported outside the law of tortious
interference.
143. See, e.g., Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Eco-
nomic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61
(1982).
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
145. Id. ch. 37, introductory note.
146. See id.
147. Id. § 767 cmt. b.
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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The inadvisability of attempting to export this privilege is
confirmed by the structure and the text of the Restatement.  To
begin with, section 890 (the section referenced by the Reynolds
court) does not itself create any “privileges”; that term is actu-
ally defined in section 10 of the Restatement.148  Together, these
two sections establish that the meaning given to the term “priv-
ilege” by tort law is highly dependent on the context in which it
is used.149
The specific “privilege” to advise others to breach a contract
is found in section 772 of the Restatement.  It provides that
“[o]ne who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a
contract or not to enter into a prospective contractual relation
with another does not interfere improperly with the other’s con-
tractual relation, by giving . . . (b) honest advice within the
scope of a request for the advice.”150  Aside from the fact that
this rule is, by its terms, highly contextual, the critical point is
that it is expressly intended to be applied in the same way to
everyone: “the rule protects the amateur as well as the profes-
sional adviser,” because “the lawyer, the doctor, the clergyman,
the banker, the investment, marriage or other counselor, and
the efficiency expert need this protection for the performance of
their tasks.”151  Thus, section 772 has been applied to lawyers,
but only in the same manner and to the same extent as it has
been applied to other professionals.152  Similarly, nothing in ei-
ther the text of section 876 or its official commentary purports
to insulate lawyers from liability that would be imposed on non-
lawyers; indeed, the opposite is true.153
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
likewise recognizes that lawyers are permitted to advise their
clients not to enter into contracts or to breach their existing con-
148. See id. § 890.
149. Id. § 890 cmt. a.
150. Id. § 772. See generally J.D. Edwards & Co. v. Podany, 168 F.3d 1020,
1022-25 (7th Cir. 1999).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772 cmt. c (1979).
152. See, e.g., Joseph P. Caulfield & Assocs. v. Litho Prods., 155 F.3d 883, 890
(7th Cir. 1998); Binns v. Flaster Greenberg, P.C., 480 F. Supp. 2d 773, 780 (E.D.
Pa. 2007); Cavicchi v. Koski, 855 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. e; Evans & Dorvee, supra
note 54, at 809-11; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in Assisting
a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 680-81 (1981);
Pepper, supra note 142, at 1597 n.117.
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tracts.154  Significantly, this Restatement takes care to point out
that lawyers’ protection from such liability is based in the law of
tortious interference.155  It also recognizes that, for this reason,
the same protection is available to “other advisors,” not just to
lawyers,156 and that a lawyer’s liability for assisting a client’s
breach of fiduciary duties is an entirely different matter.157
Thus, the Reynolds court made two fundamental errors in
relying on the cases and authorities recognizing a “privilege” to
advise others to breach a contract.  It failed to recognize that,
substantively, the “privilege” to advise or assist others to breach
a contract without incurring tort liability is inextricably inter-
twined with the law of tortious interference itself, and so it is
not readily exportable to advice or assistance in other contexts.
More importantly, the court converted a general privilege that
is available equally to all advisors into one that protects only
lawyers.
ii. Lawyers’ Fear of Civil Liability
The Oregon Supreme Court’s second reason for granting
lawyers a “privilege” to aid their clients’ breaches of fiduciary
duty was the fear that doing otherwise would leave lawyers
subject to “divided loyalties.”158  Lawyers, the court asserted,
“cannot serve their clients adequately when their own self-in-
terest— . . . the need to protect themselves from potential tort
claims by third parties—pulls in the opposite direction.”159  This
is a problem, the court wrote, because legal advice is necessary
in connection with “myriad” business transactions, as well as
civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings.160  The court be-
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 57 cmt. g
(2000) (“As with other advisors to a contracting party, lawyers are protected
against liability for interfering with contracts or with prospective contractual rela-
tions or business relationships. . . . Thus a lawyer may ordinarily, without civil
liability, advise a client not to enter a contract or to breach an existing contract.  A
lawyer may also assist such a breach, for example by sending a letter stating the
client’s intention not to perform, or by negotiating and drafting a contract, with
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lieved that protecting lawyers from civil liability for aiding and
abetting would mesh with various doctrines—“from the rules
against conflicts of interest to the confidential nature of lawyer-
client communications”—that have been developed in order to
“safeguard” the lawyer-client relationship.161  There are a host
of flaws in this reasoning.
To begin with, while it is undeniably true that lawyers per-
form their jobs in “myriad” situations, this hardly makes them
unique.162  Doctors, to cite only the most obvious example, must
apply their expertise in connection with a bewildering variety of
illnesses and medical procedures.  More to the point here, bank-
ers and accountants (among others) also face liability for advis-
ing and assisting fiduciaries with tasks across a wide spectrum
of transactions.  Indeed, it seems safe to say that one of the
characteristics that marks a person as a “professional” is that
he or she provides services in “myriad” circumstances.  There is,
therefore, no logic in protecting lawyers for this reason, but not
bankers, accountants, and other professionals who must deal
with similar complexities.
Nor is immunity from aiding and abetting liability neces-
sary in order to protect lawyers’ ability to give advice in complex
situations.  If the complexity of a given situation makes the
proper course of action unclear, the lawyer’s advice need only
reflect that fact and be tailored to accommodate those ambigui-
ties.  If the goal is—as it should be—to encourage lawyers to
give careful, properly qualified advice, giving them immunity
from liability is hardly the way to go about it.  To the contrary, a
grant of immunity is likely to have the opposite effect and en-
courage careless or even reckless advice.  Moreover, immunity,
like that granted in Reynolds, protects lawyers even when they
give advice in situations that are not complex.
Neither is it significant that lawyers are “necessary” to
many activities.163  While it is certainly true that clients need
161. Id.
162. See Barksdale, supra note 96, at 565-66 (“Given the highly contextual
nature of a fiduciary’s responsibilities to a beneficiary . . . . the line between appro-
priate conduct and breaching conduct is less clear in the close corporation
setting.”).
163. Echoing and amplifying the Reynolds court’s concern, one commentator
has opined that “[a] particularly disturbing facet of the extension of liability for
aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty into the corporate squeeze-out
29
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the services of an attorney in an endless variety of situations, it
is hard to give this fact any more significance than your average
lawyer would give to a surgeon’s plea that doctors should not be
liable for botching an operation because their services are “nec-
essary” to anyone needing surgery.  Absent evidence that law-
yers are refusing to provide legal services in certain situations
because they are afraid of aiding and abetting liability, this con-
cern is premature at best.
And while it is surely true that various doctrines have been
developed to govern the lawyer-client relationship, it is not true
that the purpose of all or even most of those doctrines is to
“safeguard” that relationship in the way the court meant it in
Reynolds—so as to protect lawyers from exposure to liability
that might inhibit their willingness to give advice.  The very
doctrines that the Reynolds court cites—the rules against con-
flicts of interest and the confidential nature of lawyer-client
communications—make the point nicely.  The latter doctrine is
not intended to protect lawyers from liability but to facilitate
the free flow of information between lawyer and client, while
the former is a direct restriction on lawyers’ unfettered freedom
to practice their profession as they see fit and, more impor-
tantly, one that can itself be an independent basis of lawyers’
liability.
One commentator frets that aiding and abetting liability
will result in a lawyer being held liable for “merely carrying out
her client’s wishes” and that “[t]he mere threat of an aiding-
and-abetting claim is enough to create pause in an attorney’s
zealous representation of her client and force her to consider
her own self-interests—resulting in a damned-if-you-do/
damned-if-you-don’t situation.”164  This is surely true, if the cli-
ent’s “wish” is to commit a tort or breach a fiduciary duty.  But
why in that situation shouldn’t lawyers pause to consider their
own potential liability?  Or, more importantly, why shouldn’t
such a lawyer pause to contemplate—and discuss with his or
her client—the client’s potential liability, because of course an
attorney only has something to worry about if his or her client
does too.  If, after the lawyer has explained the risks, the client
context stems from the necessity of attorney involvement in that type of transac-
tion.” Id. at 577.
164. Palvino, supra note 96, at 52.
30https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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decides to go ahead and commit a tort or breach of fiduciary
duty, and the lawyer signs on as an aider and abettor, why
shouldn’t they both be exposed to liability?
Lawyers neither need nor receive absolute protection from
liability in order to “safeguard” their relationship with their cli-
ents.  They have always faced liability to non-clients in certain
situations and to their clients for legal malpractice, breach of
contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.165  There is no readily
apparent reason why liability in any of these circumstances is
inherently more intrusive on the lawyer-client relationship
than is liability for aiding and abetting.  Thus, insulating law-
yers from aiding and abetting liability—even completely insu-
lating them—will hardly leave them free to advise their clients
without worrying about being sued.
iii. The Disclosure of Privileged Communications
The Oregon Supreme Court also feared that “allowing a
claim against the lawyer may raise issues of lawyer-client privi-
lege, if the preparation of an adequate defense for the lawyer
would require the disclosure of privileged communications.”166
Because aiding and abetting suits against lawyers inevitably fo-
cus on the lawyers’ interaction with their clients, the court was
surely correct that such cases will often implicate privileged at-
torney-client communications.  There are, however, several rea-
sons to believe that this is not a sufficiently serious problem to
warrant the entire elimination of lawyers’ liability for aiding
and abetting.
First, aiding and abetting liability is often premised, at
least in part, on conduct that is not protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Granewich and Reynolds are both good exam-
ples.  In each of those cases, the aiding and abetting claims
165. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, ch. 6.
166. Reynolds, 142 P.3d at 1069.  Here, the court echoed the opinion of the
appellate court in Granewich v. Harding, which rejected aiding and abetting liabil-
ity for lawyers partly because it believed that “litigation of the ‘knowledge’ element
of section 876(b) may require clients and their attorneys to disclose confidential
communications in defense of claims made against them.”  945 P.2d 1067, 1074
(Or. Ct. App. 1997).
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against the lawyers were based largely (albeit not completely)
on things the lawyers did, not on advice they gave.167
Second, in many aiding and abetting cases, the attorney-
client privilege will not be a problem because the client will
want to disclose the otherwise privileged communications.  Aid-
ing and abetting cases are, by definition, cases in which a client
is charged with committing some misconduct against a third
party that the lawyer is alleged to have assisted.  If the lawyer’s
advice to the client beforehand was that the acts in question
were legally permissible, the client will likely want to disclose
that advice in an effort to reduce or even eliminate his or her
own culpability.  Because the attorney-client privilege belongs
to the client and not the lawyer, the client would unquestiona-
bly have the power to waive the privilege in these circum-
stances.  Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers goes even further, providing that the privilege is
waived as a matter of law “if the client asserts as to a material
issue in a proceeding that: (a) the client acted upon the advice of
a lawyer or that the advice was otherwise relevant to the legal
significance of the client’s conduct . . . .”168
Nevertheless, there will unquestionably be aiding and abet-
ting cases in which the client will assert the attorney-client
privilege, while the lawyer will want to make the privileged
communications public, perhaps because he or she counseled
against the client’s actions, perhaps for some other reason.  This
divergence is not a problem when a lawyer is sued by his or her
client, because by filing suit the client voluntarily waives the
attorney-client privilege with respect to the matters at issue.169
The situation is different when the lawyer is sued by a third
party, because there the client cannot be said to have waived
the privilege.
It is, however, important to remember that the question of
whether a lawyer defending a suit brought by a third party may
disclose privileged attorney-client communications against his
or her client’s wishes is not unique to aiding and abetting cases.
Rule 1.6(b)(5) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct pro-
167. See Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 791-92 (Or. 1999); Reynolds,
142 P.3d at 1064.
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 (2000).
169. See, e.g., id. § 80(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (1983).
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR104.txt unknown Seq: 33 20-FEB-09 14:19
2008] CIVIL LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING 107
vides that lawyers “may reveal information relating to the rep-
resentation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes [that disclosure is] necessary . . . to establish a defense
to a . . . civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved . . . .”170  The comments to the rule
make clear that it applies to civil aiding and abetting claims.171
As two commentators have pointed out, when this issue
arises in litigation, the risks involved in the potential disclosure
of privileged communications are limited, because the process is
subject to judicial supervision.172  The cases suggest that courts
are acutely sensitive to the need to weigh the competing inter-
ests involved in these situations.173  While courts have, in some
cases, authorized lawyers to disclose attorney-client communi-
cations in an effort to defend themselves against suits brought
by third parties,174 they have also limited disclosure of the com-
munications to those necessary to enable the attorney to mount
a defense.175  Courts have also recognized that if they forbid
lawyers from disclosing privileged communications, they must
exercise their discretion to protect the lawyers from any unduly
harsh consequences of that ruling.  In one case, for instance, a
court held that a law firm was sufficiently prejudiced by its in-
ability to use the privileged communications to defend itself
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5).  The “information relating
to the representation of the client” referenced by this Rule encompasses more in-
formation than is protected by the attorney-client privilege. CTR. FOR PROF’L RE-
SPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 94
(6th ed. 2007).
171. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 170, at 91 (Lawyers are per-
mitted to disclose information relating to the representation in cases “based on a
wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged
by a third person, for example, a person claiming to have been defrauded by the
lawyer and client acting together.”).
172. See generally Joseph M. McMonigle & Ronald E. Mallen, The Attorney’s
Dilemma in Defending Third Party Lawsuits: Disclosure of the Client’s Confidences
or Personal Liability?, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 355 (1978).
173. See generally id.
174. See, e.g., Children First Found. v. Martinez, No. 1:04-CV-0927, 2007 WL
4344915, at *17-18 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007); Apex Mun. Fund v. N-Group Sec., 841
F. Supp. 1423, 1430 (S.D. Tex. 1993); PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
IN THE UNITED STATES § 9.56 (2d ed. 2007).
175. See, e.g., Children First Found., 2007 WL 4344915, at *18; Apex Mun.
Fund, 841 F. Supp. at 1430.
33
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR104.txt unknown Seq: 34 20-FEB-09 14:19
108 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:75
that the suit against it had to be dismissed.176  The Model Rules
give lawyers further protection in this situation, permitting
them to disclose such information in some circumstances even
before a suit is filed.177
The issue boils down to whether it is preferable for the
courts to continue balancing the competing interests involved in
these privilege situations on a case-by-case basis or to follow the
lead of the Oregon Supreme Court and adopt a bright-line rule
that eliminates the need for such balancing.  Because of the ex-
tent to which the bright-line rule is both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive, it seems clear that the former course is prefer-
able.  The bright-line rule protects attorney-client communica-
tions in numerous cases in which protection is not necessary,
such as those in which lawyers are charged with aiding and
abetting through conduct and those in which their clients will
be waiving the privilege anyway.178  In addition, because the is-
sue of whether and how to protect attorney-client information
may arise in any case in which a lawyer is sued by a third party,
not just those charging the lawyer with aiding and abetting, the
bright-line rule solves the problem of whether to permit disclo-
sure of privileged communications in only a fraction of the cases
in which it arises.179
176. McDermott, Will & Emery v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 622 (Ct. App. 2000). But see Los Angeles County Bar Assoc. Comm. on
Prof’l Responsibility and Ethics, Op. 519 (2007), available at http://www.lacba.org/
Files/Main%20Folder/Documents/%20Ethics%20%20%20Opinions/Files/Eth519_
2-26-07.pdf (ruling that there is not a self-defense exception to an attorney’s duty
to protect and preserve confidential client information in order to permit the attor-
ney to defend against third party claims).
177. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 170, at 91-92 (Rule 1.6(b)(5)
“does not require the lawyer to await the commencement of an action or proceeding
that charges such complicity [in client wrongdoing], so that the defense may be
established by responding directly to a third party who has made such an
assertion.”).
178. While the Oregon Supreme Court did not mention them, it is worth
pointing out that there are also likely to be cases in which a plaintiff third party
seeks to discover the privileged communications, and the defendant lawyer is in-
different to the disclosure, but the client does not waive the privilege.  If, in that
situation, the court refuses to order disclosure of the information, the plaintiff will
simply be left to decide whether to proceed with the suit without the privileged
information.
179. Lawyers’ liability in connection with their legal work is, of course, all
that matters here.  The Oregon Supreme Court was quick to note that its prohibi-
tion against aiding and abetting liability “protects lawyers only for actions of the
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
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The downside inherent in a bright-line rule might be tolera-
ble if the costs to the judicial system of engaging in balancing
the competing interests were high, but there is little reason to
believe that they are.  Privilege issues in general, and attorney-
client privilege issues in particular, arise all the time in litiga-
tion, and they are the kinds of issues that courts are institution-
ally well-qualified to address.180  There is, therefore, no need to
entirely bar aiding and abetting claims against lawyers in order
to protect the attorney-client privilege.
2. The Distinction Between Reynolds and Granewich
One last issue remains, and that is to consider the distinc-
tion that, according to the Oregon Supreme Court, justified the
different outcomes in Reynolds and Granewich: the fact that the
lawyers in Granewich were subject to liability for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty because their client was not
the party alleged to have breached a fiduciary duty, whereas in
Reynolds, the person alleged to have breached a fiduciary duty
was the lawyer’s client.
What the court overlooked in drawing this distinction is
that all of the considerations that led it to its holding in Reyn-
olds—the analogy to tortious interference cases and the per-
ceived need to protect attorney-client communications and
lawyers’ freedom to do their jobs without fear of liability—were
just as present in Granewich as they were in Reynolds.  Even
accepting the premise that the lawyers in Granewich were be-
ing sued because of legal work they performed for FFG, the cor-
poration had the same incentives that any client would have
had to maintain the confidentiality of its communications with
its attorneys.181  And the lawyers had no less reason to fear a
kind that permissibly may be taken by lawyers in the course of representing their
clients.  It does not protect lawyer conduct that is unrelated to the representation
of a client, even if the conduct involves a person who is a client.”  Reynolds v.
Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1069 (Or. 2006).
180. Privilege issues do not, of course, arise only in suits against lawyers.
Doctors and accountants, to name just two obvious examples, also have privileges
with their clients that may impede the discovery of information in litigation.
181. There is another possibility.  In view of the Oregon Supreme Court’s ob-
servation that the corporation had no stake in the dispute between its sharehold-
ers, there appears to be a serious question whether the lawyers in Granewich
actually represented the two shareholders, Harding and Alexander-Hergert, in-
stead of—or, at least, in addition to—the corporation. See Granewich v. Harding,
35
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suit for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty just be-
cause their client technically was not the party committing the
breach.
Looking at the issue in this way demonstrates how little is
left of the Granewich rule, following the decision in Reynolds.
For there are likely to be very few situations in which a lawyer
will know that legal work he or she is performing for a client is
at the same time substantially assisting some other person or
entity to breach a duty to a third party.  The result, therefore,
will surely be that the exception will swallow the rule and (in
Oregon at least) lawyers will almost never be exposed to civil
liability for aiding and abetting.
B. Alpert v. Crain Caton and its Progeny
The Oregon Supreme Court is not the only court to reject
aiding and abetting liability for lawyers.  In Alpert v. Crain, Ca-
ton & James, P.C.,182 the Texas Court of Appeals likewise re-
jected such liability, although it reached that conclusion by a
different route.183  As a result of this difference in approach, the
Texas court offered different reasons for rejecting the imposi-
tion of aiding and abetting liability on lawyers.184  Those rea-
sons, however, have no more merit than those articulated by
the Reynolds court.  The Texas experience is important for a
second reason as well.  While Alpert, like Reynolds, involved a
claim of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty,185 later
cases leave no doubt that the Texas courts intend to expand
lawyers’ immunity to aiding and abetting liability well beyond
that limited class of cases.
The Alpert case arose out of a dispute between a man (Rob-
ert Alpert) and his lawyer (Mark Riley).186  Their falling-out led
985 P.2d 788, 795 (Or. 1999).  The question of who a lawyer represents in such
situations is often complex. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13
(1983); MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, § 33.10; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangu-
lar Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15
(1987); Tuttle, supra note 61.  If, in fact, the lawyers did represent the sharehold-
ers, either instead of or in addition to the corporation, the distinction that the court
articulated in Reynolds evaporates entirely.
182. 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2005).
183. Id. at 402, 408.
184. Id. at 408.
185. Id. at 406-07.
186. Id. at 402.
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to litigation between them in which Riley was represented by
Crain, Caton & James, P.C. (“Crain Caton”).187  Alpert then
sued Crain Caton, making rambling allegations that it had
aided and abetted Riley’s breach of fiduciary duty to him by a
host of activities.188  He accused the firm of helping Riley use
privileged information to report him to the Internal Revenue
Service and other governmental entities, making misrepresen-
tations in connection with Riley’s former activities as his trus-
tee, diverting to Riley and the firm money that the IRS intended
for his trusts, and representing Riley in litigation with him and
his trusts.189  Alpert did not name Riley as a defendant in the
case, but did refer to him as a co-conspirator.190  The trial court
dismissed the suit,191 and the issue on appeal was whether Al-
pert stated a cause of action against Crain Caton either for aid-
ing and abetting Riley’s breach of fiduciary duty or for civil
conspiracy.192
The Texas Court of Appeals approached these issues from
the perspective of privity.  It observed that Texas courts had
historically adhered to the common law rule that attorneys are
not liable to non-client third parties for malpractice.193  Texas
courts viewed the privity rule as necessary to ensure both that
clients did not “lose control over the attorney-client relation-
ship” and that lawyers would not be “subject to almost unlim-
ited liability.”194  The Alpert court was quick to add that the
privity rule was not absolute.195  For example, it noted, the
Texas Supreme Court had recently held that attorneys, like
other professionals, could be sued by non-clients for negligent
misrepresentation under section 552 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.196
187. Id.
188. Id. at 403.
189. Id. at 403-04.
190. Id. at 402.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 404-05.
193. Id. at 405.
194. McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d
787, 793 (Tex. 1999) (quoting Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996)).
195. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 405 (“The common law [privity] rule does not apply
to all causes of action against an attorney.”).
196. McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 793.  A number of other courts have similarly
held that lawyers may be sued under section 552. See, e.g., RX USA Int’l, Inc. v.
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Continuing, the court found two other lines of precedent
relevant to the case before it.  First, it noted that Texas courts
had granted lawyers qualified immunity against suits by non-
client third parties for their actions while representing their cli-
ents in litigation.197  The court reasoned that this protection
was meant “to promote zealous representation” and that it ap-
plied even to conduct that might be considered “wrongful in the
context of the underlying lawsuit.”198  On the other hand, the
court observed, a second line of cases held that lawyers could be
sued by non-clients for fraud, even if their actions took place
within the scope of the attorney-client relationship.199  In an ef-
fort to fit his claims within these lines of precedent, Alpert ar-
gued that he stated a cause of action either on the theory “that
Crain Caton committed wrongful acts outside of litigation” or
because he alleged acts that “constitute fraud or a conspiracy to
commit fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.”200
The Court of Appeals disagreed.201  Turning first to the
“aiding and abetting” (here used in its more technically precise
sense) claim, the court observed that “the majority of Alpert’s
petition alleges that Riley had breached his fiduciary duty and
that Crain Caton had assisted him in doing so.”202  Having re-
framed the question in this manner, the court had little diffi-
culty “declin[ing] Alpert’s invitation to expand Texas law” by
creating another exception to the privity limitation, one that
would “allow a non-client to bring a cause of action for ‘aiding
and abetting’ a breach of fiduciary duty, based upon the rendi-
tion of legal advice to an alleged tortfeasor client.”203  Accord-
Super. Pharm. Co., No. CV 04-5074, 2005 WL 3333843, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005); Gerhardt v. Harris, 934 P.2d 976 (Kan. 1997); Akins v. Edmondson, 207
S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. e (2000) (providing for liability for negligent mis-
representation and noting that “[t]he cause of action [against a lawyer] ordinarily
is in substance identical to a claim for negligent misrepresentation and is subject
to rules such as those concerning proof of materiality and reliance.”).
197. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 405-06.
198. Id. at 405.
199. Id. at 406 (“A lawyer thus cannot shield his own willful and premeditated
fraudulent actions from liability simply on the ground that he is an agent of his
client.” (citing Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882))).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 413.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 407.
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ingly, the court held, “[a]bsent any allegation that Crain Caton
committed an independent tortious act or misrepresentation,”
the firm could have no possible liability for aiding and abetting
a breach of fiduciary duty because everything it was accused of
doing had taken place during its representation of Riley.204
The court then addressed Alpert’s alternative claim that
Crain Caton’s conduct amounted to a civil conspiracy.205  Here,
it was confronted with its own decision in Likover v. Sunflower
Terrace II, Ltd.206  In that case, a jury found that Likover, an
attorney, had conspired with his clients to commit fraud in con-
nection with the purchase of an apartment building.207  On the
advice of Likover, his clients had refused to execute a deed to
the property that they had previously agreed to execute, in an
effort to exercise what the jury found to be unlawful economic
duress.208  The court affirmed the verdict against Likover, re-
jecting his argument that, as an attorney representing his cli-
ent, he owed no duty to non-client third parties.209  While
lawyers have no general duties to non-clients, the Likover court
had held, they could be exposed to suit for participating in a
fraud without hampering their ability to practice their profes-
sion because “where a lawyer acting for his client participates
in fraudulent activities, his action in so doing is ‘foreign to the
duties of an attorney.’”210
Applying this holding to Alpert’s allegations, the Texas
Court of Appeals noted that all of Crain Caton’s acts about
which he was complaining—“the filing of lawsuits and plead-
ings, the providing of legal advice upon which the client acted,
and awareness of settlement negotiations”—were the kind of
tasks that lawyers are typically hired to perform.211  As none of
these acts were “foreign to the duties of an attorney,” the court
held that Crain Caton could not be liable for civil conspiracy
either.212
204. Id.
205. Id. at 407-08.
206. 696 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App. 1985).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 472.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)).
211. Alpert, 178 S.W.3d at 408.
212. Id.
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In two cases following Alpert, Texas courts applied its prin-
ciples to expand even further lawyers’ protection against claims
for aiding and abetting their clients’ misconduct.  The first,
Dixon Financial Services, Ltd. v. Greenberg, Peden, Siegmyer &
Oshman, P.C.,213 was a case in which the Texas Court of Ap-
peals considered claims that lawyers from two law firms,
Greenberg, Peden, Siegmyer & Oshman, P.C. and Johnson,
Burnett & Chang, participated with their clients in a conspiracy
to commit fraud.214  Led by attorney James Chang, the lawyers
had handled an arbitration against a securities broker, Michael
Watts, and his employer, Dixon Financial, in which the arbitra-
tors awarded their clients stock in a company called
Hyperdynamics.215  The lawyers sued to confirm the arbitration
award and, while the suit was pending, made representations to
Hyperdynamics and its stock transfer agent that allegedly in-
hibited the transfer of other shares of Hyperdynamics owned by
Dixon Financial.216  Dixon Financial and Hyperdynamics then
sued the lawyers and their clients, charging them with various
torts, including conversion, abuse of process, tortious interfer-
ence, and fraud and alleging that they were all jointly and sev-
erally liable on theories of conspiracy, agency, and concert of
action.217  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the lawyers,218 and the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed.219
The court’s decision was ostensibly based on a principle
that the Alpert court had acknowledged but found unnecessary
to apply: that lawyers are generally immune to suits brought by
third parties (typically their clients’ adversaries) for their con-
duct during litigation.220  Though the attorneys in Dixon Finan-
213. No. 01-06-00696-CV, 2008 WL 746548 (Tex. App. Mar. 20, 2008) (Mem.
Op. on Reh’g).
214. Id. at *1.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *5.
218. Id. at *1.
219. Id. at *7-9.
220. The principle that lawyers are generally immune to suits by third parties
for their handling of litigation is not unique to Texas. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 57(1)-(2) (2000).  The protection is not absolute
as lawyers have some exposure to suits for malicious prosecution and abuse of
process. Id. cmt. b. See also MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, §§ 6.8-6.24.  And, of
course, the fact that litigators’ exposure to civil suits is limited does not leave them
free to act with impunity, as courts can and do sanction lawyers for egregious con-
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cial had communicated with the stock transfer agent outside of
the suit to confirm the arbitration award, the court viewed that
conduct as “part of post-arbitration proceedings, an adversarial
process similar to litigation.”221  Thus, the court was able to dis-
tinguish Likover as a case that “did not involve conduct taken in
the context of litigation or another adversarial proceeding.”222
Significantly, however, the court did not (as it could have)
end its analysis there.  Instead, it went on to suggest that
rather than simply enforcing the settled protection that lawyers
have for their conduct in litigation, it was actually extending
the broader principles announced in Alpert to the litigation con-
text.223  The court did this by declining to address separately
each of the different torts and forms of participation liability
alleged by the plaintiffs.224  Instead, it swept them all into the
same corner, holding that in order “[t]o determine whether
Chang’s conduct (and therefore Greenberg Peden’s) was privi-
leged, we focus on whether the conduct concerned the discharge
of Chang’s duties to his client.”225  From this starting point, it
was no great leap at all to conclude that “[c]haracterizing an
attorney’s action in advancing his client’s rights as fraudulent
does not change the rule that an attorney cannot be held liable
for discharging his duties to his client.”226
A federal district court then took the step that was pre-
saged in Dixon Financial.227  In another case arising out of their
personal dispute, Alpert sued Riley and other defendants over
Riley’s alleged wrongful provision of information to the Internal
duct in the course of litigation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 57 cmt. b.
221. Dixon Fin., 2008 WL 746548, at *9.
222. Id. (citing Miller v. Stonehenge/Fasa-Texas, JDC, 993 F. Supp. 461, 465
(N.D. Tex. 1998)).
223. See id.
224. The only theory of liability that the court addressed specifically was the
claim under section 552 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.  In light of the
Texas Supreme Court’s holding in McCamish, the court was obliged to consider
(and reject) that claim on the merits. See id. at *10-11.
225. Id. at *8.
226. Id. at *9.
227. See Alpert v. Riley, No. H-04-CV-3774, 2008 WL 304742, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 31, 2008).  The reported decision in Dixon Financial was issued on March 20,
2008, after Alpert was decided, but it is actually a modified opinion on rehearing
that replaced an earlier decision that was issued before the federal court issued its
ruling in Alpert.
41
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR104.txt unknown Seq: 42 20-FEB-09 14:19
116 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:75
Revenue Service about Alpert and three of his trusts that were
not at issue in the state court case.228  Included among the de-
fendants in this second case were two lawyers that Riley had
retained to represent him in connection with his agreement to
provide the IRS with information about Alpert.229  Alpert
charged these lawyers with aiding and abetting Riley’s breach
of fiduciary duty to him and his trusts.230
The court cited Alpert for the extremely broad proposition
that “[u]nder Texas law, attorneys are generally not liable to a
third party for actions taken in connection with representing a
client.”231  Although the court noted that most of the Texas
cases applying this principle arose in the litigation context, it
reasoned that “Texas cases do not limit an attorney’s protection
against liability to actions taken in the course of representing a
client in litigation and the basis for the decisions applies to the
provision of legal services outside the litigation context.”232  As a
result, the court concluded, the fact that the lawyers being sued
in the case at issue had not been representing Riley in litigation
“does not defeat the application of the Texas ‘qualified immu-
nity’ rule.”233
Taken as a group, Alpert and the two later cases applying
its holding significantly expand the settled, but limited, princi-
ple that lawyers are protected against suits by their clients’ ad-
versaries for their handling of litigation into a far more
sweeping rule that gives lawyers almost total immunity to third
party suits for aiding and abetting the misconduct of their cli-
ents.  The somewhat different reasons that the Alpert court
gave for its linchpin holding fare no better in the face of careful




230. Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *14 (citing Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398,
406 (Tex. App. 2005)).
232. Id. at *17.
233. Id.
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1. The Flaws in the Alpert Court’s Reasons for Rejecting
Aiding and Abetting Liability for Lawyers
On the aiding and abetting (§ 876(b)-type substantial assis-
tance) claim, the Alpert court missed the point of the Texas Su-
preme Court’s ruling in McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v.
Appling Interests,234 likely because of a critical difference in the
way the courts framed the issues in the two cases.  Required to
decide whether attorneys could be held liable under section 552
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for making a negligent
misrepresentation, the McCamish court could have framed that
issue as whether to create another exception to the general rule
that lawyers have no liability to persons not in privity with
them.  Instead, the court approached the issue from the oppo-
site direction, recognizing that the question was really whether
lawyers should be exempted from a theory of liability that was
intended to apply to all professionals.235  After framing the
question this way, the McCamish court had no difficulty con-
cluding that “[w]e perceive no reason why section 552 should
not apply to attorneys.”236
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed this approach in Al-
pert.  Instead of asking whether there was a reason to exempt
lawyers from a theory of liability (aiding and abetting) that oth-
erwise applied to any professional, it framed the question as
whether there was cause to create a “new” exception to the com-
mon law rule that lawyers had no liability to persons who were
not in privity with them.237
Likely for this reason, the Alpert court missed a passage in
which the McCamish court specifically addressed the policy con-
siderations underlying the privity rule and explained why ex-
posing lawyers to section 552 liability would not cause clients to
“lose control over the attorney-client relationship” or lawyers to
be “subject to almost unlimited liability.”238  The McCamish
court pointed out that clients would not lose control over the
234. 991 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex. 1999).
235. Id. at 795.
236. Id. at 791.
237. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 404-05 (Tex. App.
2005).
238. McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 793 (quoting Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575,
577 (Tex. 1996)).
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relationship because before making statements that could form
the basis of a negligent misrepresentation suit, lawyers are obli-
gated to explain the potential ramifications of the statements—
including the possibility that the lawyer, the client, or both of
them might be exposed to a suit by the third party if the state-
ments proved false—and the potential impact of such a suit on
the client’s ability to claim the attorney-client privilege.239  The
client can then decide whether to run these risks by having the
lawyer make the statements in question, avoid the risks en-
tirely by directing the lawyer not to make the statements, or
reduce the risks by directing the lawyer to modify the state-
ments before making them.240
From the lawyer’s perspective, the McCamish court pointed
out, liability under section 552 is hardly “unlimited”; it exists
only when a lawyer has provided information to a non-client
with the intent that the third party rely on that information,
and the third party has justifiably relied on the lawyer’s state-
ment.241  The lawyer can control the liability by limiting the list
of persons who may permissibly rely on his or her statements,
by crafting appropriate disclaimers to the statements, or by
simply declining to make them in the first place.242  Nowhere is
it written that lawyers must expose themselves to liability by
making written representations just because their clients ask
them to do so.
For the same reasons, exposing lawyers to aiding and abet-
ting liability would not cause clients to “ ‘lose control over the
attorney-client relationship’” . . . or lawyers to be “ ‘subject to
almost unlimited liability.’”243  Indeed, in at least two ways ex-
posure to aiding and abetting liability is even less risky (from
the lawyer’s perspective) than exposure to section 552 liability.
First, aiding and abetting liability is imposed only for knowing
and intentional conduct, while section 552 liability can be im-
posed even for statements made negligently.  Second, aiding
and abetting liability requires substantial assistance to a
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at
793-94.
242. McCamish, 991 S.W.2d at 794.
243. Id. at 793 (quoting Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex. 1996)).
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wrongdoer.  At the end of the day, however, lawyers worried
about aiding and abetting liability, like lawyers worried about
section 552 liability, can always “just say ‘no.’”
The Alpert court’s reason for rejecting the civil conspiracy
claim against the law firm is equally flawed.  Distinguishing the
holding in Likover, that lawyers may be sued for their participa-
tion in fraud because fraudulent conduct is “foreign to the du-
ties of an attorney,” the court observed that there was nothing
“foreign” in the Crain Caton firm’s filing of court papers or giv-
ing legal advice to its client.244  What the court overlooked is
that the lawyer in Likover had done nothing other than give
legal advice either.  The key, as the Likover court recognized but
the Alpert court did not, is that a lawyer’s conduct, whether giv-
ing legal advice or preparing court papers or other legal docu-
ments, is almost always neutral when analyzed in the abstract,
divorced from its purpose or context.  It is only by examining
conduct in context that one can assess whether it is “foreign to
the duties of an attorney.”245  The driver of the getaway car is,
after all, only operating an automobile, and no one would excuse
his conduct just because he had a valid driver’s license and
obeyed the traffic laws.
C. Durham v. Guest
In Durham v. Guest,246 the New Mexico Court of Appeals
became the third court to reject, on policy grounds, a claim
against a lawyer for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty.247  The lawyer in that case, Suzanne Guest, had been
hired by Allstate Insurance Company to represent its interests
in a claim made by Jamie and Travis Durham for compensation
under the uninsured motorist provisions of their automobile in-
surance policy.248  The Durhams rejected Allstate’s offer of
$13,300, and the claim proceeded to an arbitration in which
Guest represented Allstate.249  After the arbitrators awarded
244. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 408 (Tex. App.
2005).
245. Id.
246. 171 P.3d 756 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), cert. granted, 172 P.3d 1286 (N.M.
2007).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 819-20.
249. Id. at 819.
45
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR104.txt unknown Seq: 46 20-FEB-09 14:19
120 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:75
the Durhams $45,000, they sued Allstate and Guest, alleging
various causes of action arising out of the handling of their
claim prior to and during the arbitration.250
The district court dismissed all the claims against Guest,
and the Court of Appeals focused principally on the claim charg-
ing her with aiding and abetting Allstate’s alleged breach of fi-
duciary duty.251  Because it read the Durhams’ complaint to
challenge only Guest’s conduct after they demanded arbitra-
tion,252 the court could simply have held that she was protected
by the lawyer’s traditional litigation immunity.  Instead, it
deployed a much wider pen.
The court relied heavily on several sections of the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers.253  It cited section
51(4) for the proposition that lawyers who represent fiduciaries
have no duty to the beneficiaries of those fiduciaries, a puzzling
citation since Guest was charged with aiding and abetting, not
a direct breach of duty.254  The court also cited section 56 for the
proposition that lawyers are not liable to non-clients for advis-
ing their clients about the legality of their conduct or for coun-
seling them to break contracts, though neither of these
propositions was implicated by the facts of the case.255  The
court then pointed out that the plaintiffs’ allegations did not
bring the case within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege, even though that had nothing to do with the
case either.256  Finally, the court cited Reynolds for the proposi-
tion that courts in other jurisdictions “hold that an attorney is
not liable for activities conducted in the course of representa-
tion but is liable when acting outside the scope of
representation.”257
The court did not cite section 57 of the Restatement (the
provision containing the litigation privilege).  Indeed, it was al-
most as an afterthought that the court added that “Plaintiffs do
not allege actions on the part of Defendant that would fall
250. Id. at 758.
251. See id.
252. Id. at 761.
253. Id. at 822.
254. Id. at 823.
255. Id. at 762.
256. Id. at 763.
257. Id. at 762.
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outside of a qualified litigation privilege.”258  Had the court con-
fined its analysis to this principle, its holding would have been
unexceptional.  Instead, the decision is noteworthy because the
court so clearly meant to grant lawyers broad protection against
lawsuits charging them with aiding and abetting their clients’
misconduct.259
D. The California Cases
The California courts have undoubtedly written more opin-
ions addressing aiding and abetting claims against attorneys
than the courts of any other state, and there is a perception in
some quarters that they too are hostile to such claims.260  Be-
cause that perception is erroneous and the California courts
have actually accepted in principle the idea that lawyers can be
liable for aiding and abetting wrongdoing by their clients, dis-
cussion of those cases might be seen as unnecessary here.
Nevertheless, a brief detour to consider the California case
seems justified for two reasons.  First, there is something to be
said for setting the record straight, particularly in view of the
large number of California cases that are out there.  Second, a
commentator recently proposed California’s approach as a good
model for addressing aiding and abetting claims against law-
yers, and it is worth evaluating the merits of that proposal.
California’s experience with aiding and abetting claims is
generally traced to Wolfrich Corp. v. United Services Automo-
bile Association,261 a case in which the California Court of Ap-
peal held that attorneys representing an insurance company
could be sued for conspiring with their client to violate a Cali-
fornia statute regulating the processing of insurance claims.262
The Wolfrich decision apparently triggered so many similar
claims against attorneys that the California legislature felt
258. Id. at 763.
259. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted the Durhams’ petition for certi-
orari, and the case is now pending in that court. See Durham v. Guest, 172 P.3d
1286 (N.M. 2007).
260. See, e.g., Barksdale, supra note 96, at 587-98 (discussing the principle of
“attorney non-accountability” (citing Doctors’ Co. v. Super. Ct., 775 P.2d 508 (Cal.
1989); Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Ct. App.
1991))).
261. 197 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App. 1983).
262. Id. at 447.
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obliged to enact a statute limiting them.  The resulting statute,
section 1714.10 of the California Civil Code, barred plaintiffs
from filing such a suit against an attorney until a court made a
preliminary finding that the claim had a reasonable chance of
succeeding.263
Shortly after the legislature acted, the California Supreme
Court decided Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court.264  In Doctors’ Co.,
the court overruled Wolfrich, holding that conspiracy is not an
independent tort and that attorneys cannot be sued for conspir-
acy unless they owe an independent duty to the plaintiff or act
for their personal gain.265  The legislature responded to the Doc-
tors’ Co. decision by amending section 1714.10 to limit its appli-
cation to suits arising out of an attorney’s involvement in an
attempt to contest or settle a claim and by codifying the two
Doctors’ Co. exceptions.266  The California courts subsequently
concluded that the amendment rendered the statute essentially
pointless, as its “gatekeeper” function now precludes only suits
that would not be viable under Doctors’ Co. anyway.267
263. See Berg & Berg Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 334
(Ct. App. 2005); Barksdale, supra note 96, at 593-94.
264. 775 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1989).
265. Id. at 509-12.  Although the defendants in Doctors’ Co. happened to be
attorneys, the court’s rationale clearly applied to any agent sued for conspiracy.
266. Berg & Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 335.  In its current form, section
1714.10(a) provides:
No cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her
client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute,
and which is based upon the attorney’s representation of the client, shall be
included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order
allowing the pleading that includes the claim for civil conspiracy to be filed
after the court determines that the party seeking to file the pleading has
established that there is a reasonable probability that the party will prevail
in the action.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10(a) (2008).  Section 1714.10(c) provides:
This section shall not apply to a cause of action against an attorney for a
civil conspiracy with his or her client, where (1) the attorney has an inde-
pendent legal duty to the plaintiff, or (2) the attorney’s acts go beyond the
performance of a professional duty to serve the client and involve a conspir-
acy to violate a legal duty in furtherance of the attorney’s financial gain.
Id. § 1714.10(c).
267. Berg & Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 335.  This history is exhaustively chroni-
cled in Pavicich v. Santucci, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125 (Ct. App. 2000). See also Evans
& Dorvee, supra note 54, at 811-15.
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Presumably as a result of this history, the California courts
appear to be confronted with more civil conspiracy claims than
the courts of other states.268  The California courts also recog-
nize claims alleging substantial assistance (“aiding and abet-
ting” in the precise, technical sense).269  And it appears to be an
open question in California whether the latter claims are within
the scope of section 1714.10.270
The important point here, however, is that Doctors’ Co. and
its progeny have been cited as evidence that California courts
have developed special rules limiting aiding and abetting claims
against lawyers.271  This is not a correct reading of these cases.
The suit in Doctors’ Co. was brought against attorneys, and the
ruling in that case does circumscribe the availability of civil
conspiracy claims, at least, and perhaps aiding and abetting
claims, as well.272  But the court’s rationale was not that there is
anything special or unique about the status of attorneys.273
Rather, the decision was based on the nature of civil conspiracy
itself.274  There is no reason to believe that the court’s holding—
that, with two exceptions, agents cannot conspire with their
principals—would have been any different even if the agent in
that case had been someone other than an attorney.
Nevertheless, section 1714.10 does establish a special rule
for handling civil conspiracy cases brought against attorneys,
and a commentator recently suggested that this approach is one
that other states ought to emulate.275  The problem with this
suggestion is that because the California statute is strictly pro-
cedural, it would not provide anything near the protection de-
sired by those who would limit aiding and abetting claims
against attorneys.  Substantively, section 1714.10 only codifies
268. See, e.g., Mills v. Ramona Tire, Inc., No. 07-CV-0052-H, 2007 WL
2775127, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007); Panoutsopoulos v. Chambliss, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 647 (Ct. App. 2007); Berg & Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325; Pavicich, 102
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125.
269. See, e.g., Neilson v. Union Bank of Cal., N.A., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1133-
36 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Berg & Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 340 n.10; Casey v. U.S. Bank
Nat’l Ass’n, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 405-06 (Ct. App. 2005).
270. Berg & Berg, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 340 n.10.
271. See supra note 261.
272. Doctors’ Co. v. Superior Court, 775 P.2d 508, 509-10 (Cal. 1989).
273. See id.
274. Id. at 510-11.
275. Lewinbuk, supra note 96, at 171-72.
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the rule of general application articulated in Doctors’ Co., under
which the merits of claims against lawyers are treated just as
they would be if anyone else was the defendant.276  And because
the statute applies only to one very limited type of claim (civil
conspiracy claims against lawyers), the impact of its replication
in other jurisdictions would be quite limited.  The statute’s
scope could, of course, be expanded, but how?  To include “aid-
ing and abetting”277 claims against lawyers?  But what makes
that the right place to draw the line?  Why not all civil suits
filed against lawyers?  Or all civil conspiracy or aiding and abet-
ting claims against any defendant?
More importantly, no great benefit would be likely to result
from burdening the courts with the procedural duty to conduct
a special “pre-screening” of certain cases filed against lawyers.
Because it only “pre-screens” out cases that would not be viable
anyway, the California statue is now seen as essentially point-
less in California itself.278  Moreover, the courts have already
demonstrated that they are perfectly capable of disposing of
meritless civil conspiracy or aiding and abetting claims against
lawyers through the procedural devices (motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment) that they use to weed out such claims
against other defendants.279
III. Inconsistencies that Result from Excusing Lawyers from
Liability for Aiding and Abetting
There are serious problems with the decisions rejecting
lawyers’ liability for aiding and abetting that go beyond the
flaws in the reasons that courts have given for reaching those
decisions.  The rulings also create inconsistencies in the way
that the law is applied in similar situations.  The most funda-
mental inconsistency, one that is likely to bedevil courts in fu-
ture cases, centers on which claims against lawyers would be
barred at the courthouse doors.  More specifically, the question
is whether decisions immunizing lawyers against civil aiding
and abetting liability could be limited to cases charging lawyers
276. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10 (2008).
277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
278. See supra text accompanying note 267.
279. See cases cited supra note 11 and infra notes 349 & 373.
50https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss1/4
\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-1\PLR104.txt unknown Seq: 51 20-FEB-09 14:19
2008] CIVIL LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING 125
with aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty or to some
other subset of aiding and abetting cases.
A. Limiting the Lawyers’ Privilege to Aid and Abet to Breach
of Fiduciary Duty Cases
Each of the decisions rejecting lawyer liability for aiding
and abetting (Durham, Reynolds, and Alpert) did so in the con-
text of a claim that a lawyer aided and abetted a client’s breach
of fiduciary duty.280  It therefore makes sense to ask whether a
ban on civil aiding and abetting claims against lawyers could or
should be limited to claims alleging that the lawyer aided and
abetted a breach of fiduciary duty, or whether there is some
other place where courts could feasibly draw a line between the
cases in which lawyers face civil liability for aiding and abetting
and those in which they do not.
In thinking about this question, it is helpful to consider the
types of aiding and abetting claims that might be filed against
lawyers.  While there do not appear to be any reliable statistics
on this issue, the nature of a lawyer’s role suggests, and the
reported decisions cited in the footnotes of this article confirm,
that—statutory claims aside—the vast majority of civil suits
charging lawyers with aiding and abetting involve claims that a
lawyer aided and abetted either (a) a fraud, (b) a breach of trust
or (c) a breach of fiduciary duty.
1. Aiding and Abetting Fraud
No one disputes the principle that lawyers may not aid
their clients’ frauds. Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct mandates that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”281  Supporting this rule is
Rule 4.1, which bars lawyers from making “a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person”282 and from “fail[ing] to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
280. See Durham v. Guest, 172 P.3d 1286 (N.M. 2007); Reynolds v. Schrock,
142 P.3d 1062 (Or. 2006); Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398
(Tex. App. 2005).
281. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983).
282. Id. R. 4.1(a).
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client . . . .”283  In 2003, Rule 1.6 was amended to add subsec-
tions (b)(2) and (3), which authorize lawyers to disclose even
privileged information to prevent client fraud and to make the
disclosure before the fraud has even occurred, if disclosure
might prevent it.284
Disdain for lawyer-aided fraud is just as easy to find in the
civil litigation arena.  The disciplinary rules mirror the widely-
accepted evidentiary rule known as the “crime-fraud” exception
to the attorney-client privilege.285  More to the point, there are
plenty of cases in which courts have upheld claims against law-
yers for aiding and abetting fraud.286  Many of these cases arise
in the securities context, but the complaints often contain com-
mon law counts in addition to the statutory claims (especially
since the Central Bank decision).287  Even the Texas courts per-
mit attorneys to be sued for aiding and abetting fraud.288  It
therefore seems fair to say, as one commentator has, that “an
attorney’s loyalty is subject to the overriding general norm, in
both ethics and law, that lawyers must not knowingly give sub-
stantial assistance to client fraud.”289
A court holding that lawyers are privileged to aid and abet
a breach of fiduciary duty must therefore be prepared to explain
how such conduct differs from aiding and abetting a fraud.  In
Alpert, the Texas Court of Appeals attempted to do so by assert-
ing that a lawyer who participates in fraudulent activities may
be held liable to a non-client because “his action is ‘foreign to
the duties of an attorney.’”290  But the court did not say why it is
283. Id. R. 4.1(b).
284. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3).
285. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000).
See generally David J. Fried, Too High a Price for the Truth: The Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV.
443 (1986); Earl J. Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and Work-Product Doctrine, the Lawyer’s Obligations of Disclosure, and the
Lawyer’s Response to Accusations of Wrongful Conduct, 23 AM. CRI. L. REV. 351
(1986); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Crime-Fraud Exception to Attorney-Client
Privilege in State Courts—Contemplated Crime, 9 A.L.R. 6th 363 (2005).
286. See supra notes 57 & 69.
287. They also frequently contain claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty, a
subject addressed in the next section.
288. See supra text accompanying note 206.
289. Langevoort, supra note 31, at 78.
290. Alpert v. Crain, Caton & Jones, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398, 406 (Tex. App.
2005) (quoting Poole v. Houston & T.C. Ry., 58 Tex. 134, 137 (1882)).
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not equally “foreign” for an attorney (or anyone else, for that
matter) to aid and abet a breach of fiduciary duty.291  No other
court appears to have made this distinction, and many recog-
nize both causes of action, typically in the same opinion.292  So
what arguments might be made in support of a distinction be-
tween fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in this context?
A distinction based on the required level of assistance
would not go very far.  In Likover, the Texas Court of Appeals
held that lawyers may be held liable when they “participate” in
a fraud,293 and it might be posited that such “participation” re-
quires more lawyer involvement than would be required to
prove that a lawyer “aided and abetted” a breach of fiduciary
duty.  But even if courts were to hold that lawyers had no liabil-
ity for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty unless
their conduct rose above “substantial assistance” to a level that
might be labeled “participation,” that would be a far cry from
saying that they have no liability at all.294
A second possible basis of distinction is to point out that
fraud is a tort while a breach of fiduciary duty is something
else.  But what is it?  It is generally agreed that the concept of a
“fiduciary” originated in the law of trusts and that it has since
291. As noted earlier, the Oregon Supreme Court expressly rejected this con-
tention in Granewich. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
292. See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2006) (recogniz-
ing both claims under Illinois law); Mazzaro De Abreu v. Bank of Am. Corp., 525 F.
Supp. 2d 381, 387-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (recognizing the existence and thoroughly
analyzing the elements of aiding and abetting fraud and aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty under New York law); Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Mon-
treal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Secs., 446 F. Supp. 2d 163, 201-04 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (same); Sender v. Mann, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1166 (D. Colo. 2006) (recog-
nizing both claims under Colorado law); World Health Alternatives, Inc. v. McDon-
ald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.), 385 B.R. 576, 594 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008)
(recognizing both claims under Florida law).  The Georgia courts, curiously, have
recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty but
not (at least not yet) one for aiding and abetting fraud.  See BMC-The Benchmark
Mgmt. Co. v. Ceebraid-Signal Corp., No. 1:05-CV-1149-WSD, 2007 WL 2126272, at
*11 (N.D. Ga. July 23, 2007) (declining to recognize claim for aiding and abetting
fraud under Georgia law); Insight Tech., Inc. v. Freightcheck, LLC, 633 S.E.2d
373, 378-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (approving claim for aiding and abetting a breach
of fiduciary duty).
293. See Likover, 696 S.W.2d at 472.
294. There is, in any event, no reason to believe that the Texas courts in-
tended to make this distinction. See, e.g., Palvino, supra note 96, at 52 n.1 (“As a
practical matter, any distinctions between ‘participating’ and ‘aiding and abetting’
are irrelevant when it comes to this type of non-client claim.”).
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evolved to cover a number of different situations in which one
party reposes trust and confidence in another.295  But diving
any deeper than this leads quickly to a quagmire, because
“[f]iduciary obligation is one of the most elusive concepts in An-
glo-American law.”296  Any effort to sketch the contours of that
concept in a way that would advance the analysis here would be
both difficult and unlikely to result in conclusions that would be
universally accepted.297
One could sidestep this quagmire (albeit not in a way that
would support those who oppose applying aiding and abetting
liability to lawyers) by pointing out that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts places fiduciaries under the tort law umbrella.298
The fit is not exact, however, as the Restatement acknowledges,
for instance, that the measure of damages may be less in a case
of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty than it would
be in a case of aiding and abetting a tort.299  Moreover, the Re-
statement’s treatment of breaches of fiduciary duty as a species
of tort has not been uniformly accepted,300 and there is also the
295. Anderson & Steele, supra note 50, at 239-43; Tuttle, supra note 61, at
896.
296. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obliga-
tion, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1988). See also Barksdale, supra note 96, at 556.
297. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983)
(“The twentieth century is witnessing an unprecedented expansion and develop-
ment of the fiduciary law.”); Anderson & Steele, supra note 50, at 242 (“The juris-
prudential underpinnings of fiduciary obligation have never been mapped
successfully.”).
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (“One standing in a fiduci-
ary relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from
a breach of duty imposed by the relation.”); Id. cmt. c (“A person who knowingly
assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty of tortious con-
duct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused.”). See also AmeriFirst
Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (“[T]he majority of case
law . . . recognizes a cause of action for aiding and abetting common law torts, such
as breach of fiduciary duty.”).
299. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. c (suggesting that it
may not be appropriate to impose on an aider and abettor the fiduciary’s liability
to disgorge any profit he made on an improper transaction); Barksdale, supra note
96, at 559.
300. See, e.g., Roemmich v. Eagle Eye Dev., 526 F.3d 343, 350 (8th Cir. 2008)
(“[B]reaches of fiduciary duty are sometimes conceptualized as sounding in tort.”);
Tobacco Tech., Inc. v. Taiga Int’l, N.V., No. CCB-06-0563, 2007 WL 644463, at *6-7
(D. Md. Feb. 26, 2007) (noting that Maryland does not recognize a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty, but treats such claims as a form of negligence); Kinzer
v. City of Chicago, 539 N.E.2d 1216, 1220 (Ill. 1989) (“This court has not accepted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts view but has regarded breach of fiduciary duty
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tricky matter of trustees, who the Restatements treat
separately.301
It has been suggested that fraud by its nature involves com-
plex “schemes” perpetrated by a group of persons in circum-
stances that make it difficult to single out one of those
participants as the primary wrongdoer and the others as mere
“assistants” or “aiders and abettors.”302  Judge Posner has as-
serted that when it comes to fraud there is no need for aiding
and abetting liability at all because those involved will always
have primary liability.303  But, of course, breaches of fiduciary
duty can be just as complex as frauds.  Indeed, the inherent
complexity of fiduciary roles and obligations, and the difficulties
lawyers face when they try to give clients guidance about that
nebulous concept and its attendant duties, has been cited as a
reason lawyers should not face liability for aiding and abetting
breaches of fiduciary duty.304
But there is one significant difference between fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty for purposes of aiding and abetting lia-
bility.  Aiding and abetting liability is often redundant and
therefore unnecessary in the fraud context because the lawyer
can usually (always, if Judge Posner is correct) be charged with
the underlying tort.  But the opposite is true for breaches of fi-
duciary duty, because, most of the time at least, those alleged to
have aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty are not them-
as controlled by the substantive laws of agency, contract and equity.”) (citations
omitted); Mack v. Am. Fletcher Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 725, 738 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987) (“[T]he trend in jurisdictions which have confronted the matter
head-on . . . is to declare that a breach of fiduciary duty is a tort”); Anderson &
Steele, supra note 50 (discussing the differences between negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty claims against lawyers).
301. See infra text accompanying note 353.
302. Langevoort, supra note 31, at 95.
303. See, e.g., Eastern Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc., 229 F.3d 617, 624 (7th Cir.
2000) (Posner, J.) (“Law should be kept as simple as possible.  One who aids and
abets a fraud is guilty of the tort of fraud (sometimes called deceit); nothing is
added by saying that he is guilty of the tort of aiding and abetting as well or in-
stead.”).  Plaintiffs have an incentive to charge lawyers with aiding and abetting
rather than fraud, however, because professional malpractice insurance policies
often have exclusions for fraudulent conduct that may not apply if the lawyer is
charged only with aiding and abetting. See Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 255-56.
304. Barksdale, supra note 96, at 565-66; Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 235-39.
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selves fiduciaries of the injured party.305  They therefore cannot
be charged as principal wrongdoers, and their liability, if it ex-
ists at all, must be as an aider and abettor.  It makes little sense
for the law to permit lawyers to be sued as aiders and abettors
in cases where the theory is usually cumulative but not in cases
in which there can be no liability other than by way of aiding
and abetting.
In this connection, it might be pointed out that the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibit lawyers from
participating in “crimes” and “fraud” but not breaches of fiduci-
ary duty.306  And at least one commentator has suggested that
lawyers should not be exposed to civil liability for conduct that
is not a discipline issue.307  This argument ignores the distinc-
tion between discipline and civil liability.308  More importantly,
the Rules do not say, and there is no reason to believe, that
their failure to prohibit lawyer participation in breaches of fidu-
ciary duty was meant as an implicit sanction of such conduct
any more than their failure to mention, for example, breaches of
trust was intended to bless lawyer involvement in that or any
other form of wrongdoing.309  The Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers, which does address civil liability, spe-
cifically contemplates that “[l]awyers are also liable to non-
clients for knowingly participating in their clients’ breach of
fiduciary duties owed by clients to nonclients.”310
305. It might be argued that aiding and abetting liability is not necessary in
this context, because a beneficiary injured by a breach of fiduciary duty is a client
who can sue the attorney directly.  There is some, but only some, merit in this
observation.  The question of whether a lawyer hired to represent a fiduciary also
represents the fiduciary’s beneficiaries has been the subject of considerable debate.
See, e.g., MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 48, § 33.10; Hazard, supra note 153; Jeffrey
N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who is the Client?, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (1994); Tuttle, supra note 61.  When the lawyer does re-
present the beneficiaries as well as the fiduciary, the beneficiaries would of course
become a client entitled to sue the lawyer directly.
306. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983).
307. Barksdale, supra note 96, at 582-83.
308. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(2) &
cmt. c (2000); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWY-
ERING § 5.14 (3d ed. 2001).
309. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.
310. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. h.  The
Restatement also provides that a lawyer owes a duty of care to non-clients when:
[T]he lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is necessary with
respect to a matter within the scope of the representation to prevent or rec-
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There is, therefore, no readily apparent principle around
which to construct an argument that fraud is different from, or
more serious than, a breach of fiduciary duty in a way that
would justify exposing lawyers to liability for assisting the for-
mer but not the latter.  If anything, the opposite is true.311  But
perhaps things would look differently if the issue was ap-
proached from the opposite direction.
2. Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Trust
Consider the following case.  A woman named Evah estab-
lishes a trust that is to end five years after her death, at which
time the assets are to be divided between her children, George
and Susan, unless either of them dies during the five-year pe-
riod, in which case that child’s share passes to his or her issue.
Evah dies and George becomes the trustee of her trust.  George,
who is very ill, wishes to disinherit his children from his first
marriage, including Kenton.  He hires an attorney, Shaw, and
gives her a copy of Evah’s trust.  Shaw then drafts two docu-
ments reflecting an agreement by George and Susan to immedi-
ately terminate their mother’s trust and distribute its assets.
George forwards the documents to the brokerage firm holding
the trust’s assets, and it distributes those assets to him and Su-
san.  George dies within five years of Evah’s death, and his will
does not leave any of the proceeds of her trust to Kenton, who
then sues Shaw for drafting the documents terminating his
grandmother’s trust early, thereby depriving him of assets that
would otherwise have passed to him on his father’s death.
These are the facts of Moore v. Shaw.312  It is a case in
which the attorney, Shaw, performed one simple act of classic
legal services: she drafted two documents reflecting the agree-
tify the breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the client to the nonclient, where
(i) the breach is a crime of fraud or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting
the breach.
Id. § 51(4)(b).  Direct duties are of course different than liability for aiding and
abetting, but this section provides at least mild support for the argument that law-
yers may be sued for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.
311. See, e.g., Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 794 (Or. 1999) (“[I]t espe-
cially would be odd for the law to afford beneficiaries of fiduciary relationships less
protection from the malfeasance of third parties than would be available to the
victims of other kinds of tortious conduct.”).
312. 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154 (Ct. App. 2004).
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ment between two trust beneficiaries to terminate the trust and
distribute its assets.  She did not have a financial stake in the
transaction beyond her legal fees.  She had no direct duty to
Kenton.313  There was no fraud involved (at least not in the clas-
sic sense of a misrepresentation made by George on which
Kenton relied to his detriment), nor was there any apparent
need for Kenton to discover any confidential communications
that Shaw may have had with her client, George.  Yet, despite
all this, the court had no difficulty concluding that Kenton had
a viable aiding and abetting claim against Shaw.314  The inter-
esting question is “why?”
The answer is that Kenton Moore styled his claim as one
for aiding and abetting a breach of trust instead of aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.  As a result, the court cited
section 326 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and several
other authorities for the principle that those who participate
with a trustee in a breach of trust are liable to the beneficiaries
for any loss caused thereby.315  This included Shaw, as it has
been generally accepted for a long time that lawyers are no dif-
ferent than anyone else when it comes to liability for participat-
ing in a breach of trust.316  All of which neatly frames the
question of whether Moore, and the well-established line of
cases that it represents, can be reconciled with cases holding
that lawyers may aid and abet their clients’ breaches of fiduci-
ary duty.317
313. This appears to be the law in California. See Berg & Berg Enters. v.
Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 342 (Ct. App. 2005).  Other states might
see it differently. See supra note 305.
314. The case arose in an unusual procedural posture that is irrelevant for
present purposes.  What the appellate court actually concluded was that “Kenton
established a probability of prevailing on his causes of action against Nancy Shaw
for intentional and negligent participation in a breach of trust.” Moore, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 165 (footnote omitted).
315. Id. at 164-65.
316. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
317. It does appear that the California courts have applied the ruling in Doc-
tors’ Co. to claims of participation in a breach of trust. See Wolf v. Mitchell, Silber-
berg & Knupp, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792, 797-98 (Ct. App. 1999); Pierce v. Lyman, 3
Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 243 (Ct. App. 1991).  Thus, although the court in Moore did not
address the issue, there is reason to question whether Shaw would ultimately be
held liable to Moore, as there is nothing in the facts set forth in the court’s opinion
to indicate that either of the Doctors’ Co. exceptions was implicated.
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Here too one could argue that section 326 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts, which imposes liability on those who
“participate” in a breach of trust, sets the “involvement” bar
higher than the “substantial assistance” requirement in section
876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  But no one has at-
tempted to make this case and, again, saying that lawyers
should not face liability for aiding and abetting a breach of fidu-
ciary duty unless their conduct meets some higher “participa-
tion” standard is entirely different from saying that they should
have no liability at all.
Another possible distinction might, of course, be to argue
that all fiduciaries are not created equal.  One could posit that
trustees are not just any old fiduciaries but the quintessential
fiduciaries and that this fact justifies a more stringent prohibi-
tion against aiding and abetting in the trust context.  On the
surface, section 51(4) the Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers provides support for such a distinction.  It im-
poses on lawyers a duty to non-clients to avoid assisting their
clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty when those breaches consti-
tute crimes or frauds and, by its terms, applies only to lawyers
whose “client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary act-
ing primarily to perform similar functions for the nonclient
. . . .”318  A comment explains that the limitation to certain types
of fiduciaries was meant to make clear that the duty that this
section imposes on lawyers does not extend to situations involv-
ing fiduciary clients like “a partner in a business partnership, a
corporate officer or director, or a controlling stockholder” where
the lawyer is more likely “to encounter conflicting considera-
tions arising from other responsibilities of the fiduciary-client
than are entailed in other relationships in which fiduciary duty
is only part of a broader role.”319
The problem is that it is one thing to impose affirmative
duties on lawyers who represent certain kinds of fiduciaries and
quite another to restrict their civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting fiduciary misconduct.320  Nothing in the Restatement pro-
vides, or even suggests, that lawyers’ civil liability for aiding
318. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(4)(a) (2000).
319. Id. § 51 cmt h.
320. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING 4-32 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (noting the difference between a lawyer’s af-
59
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and abetting should be limited to situations in which they have
assisted one of the fiduciaries listed in section 51(4); indeed, it
says the opposite.321
The absence of a workable distinction between trustees and
other kinds of fiduciaries, at least for present purposes, is rein-
forced by the fact that when courts have been called upon to
consider claims of aiding and abetting a breach of trust or a
breach of some other fiduciary duty, they often use the terms
“breach of trust” and “breach of fiduciary duty” as if they were
synonyms, and they rely on breach of trust authorities in breach
of fiduciary cases and vice versa.322  The Restatements and the
commentators do the same.323
There is, therefore, no readily apparent basis, either in the-
ory or in practice, for concluding that breaches of trust (in the
classic, technical sense) are so different from other breaches of
fiduciary duty that lawyers should be permitted to aid their cli-
ents with the latter but not the former.
firmative duty to act to protect third parties and the duty to refrain from aiding a
client in legally wrongful conduct).
321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. h
(2000).
322. See, e.g., Javitch v. Prudential Sec., No. 3:02 CV 7072, 2003 WL
21204049, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 13, 2003) (noting that the same principles apply to
breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty). See also Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons
Contractors, 974 F.2d 270, 283-84 (2d Cir. 1992); Whitfield v. Lindemann, 853 F.2d
1298, 1302-03 (5th Cir. 1988); Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1082-83 (7th Cir.
1982); In re Transcon. Energy Corp., 683 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1982); Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp. v. United Am. Bank of Memphis, 21 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795-801
(W.D. Tenn. 1998); Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Benvenuto v. Schneider, 678 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Berg & Berg
Enters. v. Sherwood Partners, 32 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325, 341-44 (Ct. App. 2005); Wil-
liams Mgmt. Enters. v. Buonauro, 489 So. 2d 160, 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Spinner v. Nutt, 631 N.E.2d 542, 556-57 (Mass. 1994); Granewich v. Harding, 985
P.2d 788, 794 n.5 (Or. 1999).
323. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. c (1979) (“A person
who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is himself guilty
of tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused.”); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. h (2000) (“Lawyers
are also liable to nonclients for knowingly participating in their clients’ breach of
fiduciary duties owed by clients to nonclients.” (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 326 (1959))); Barksdale, supra note 96, at 557 n.40 (“[T]he common law
has long recognized that one who assists a fiduciary’s breach of duty may be liable
to the beneficiary.” (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993))).
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3. The Impossibility of Reconciling These Lines of Cases
How about approaching the question from a broad, theoret-
ical perspective?  Is there some universal principle with which
one could reconcile cases holding that lawyers are liable for aid-
ing and abetting a fraud and aiding and abetting a breach of
trust with cases holding that they are not liable for aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty?  No court appears to have
made the effort to identify such a principle, but several com-
mentators have dabbled with it.
The most extensive effort comes from Stanley Pietrusiak,
who is probably the harshest critic of exposing lawyers to civil
aiding and abetting liability.  He prefaces his argument with a
dire warning that aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty
is an “ominous new form of attorney liability” which, at least to
the extent that it is applied to corporate attorneys, will result in
lawyers being “held liable for aiding any bad policy decision
that is later found to be a breach of the corporate representa-
tive’s fiduciary duties to the corporation.”324  As Pietrusiak sees
it:
While existing case law deals with lawyers directly as-
sisting clients in violating established law (typically
crimes involving fraud), this radical expansion of the
theory would seem to impose liability for attorney con-
duct that in no way violates the law, even though the
corporate fiduciary, by making less favorable decisions
than he or she might have, may have breached his or
her duty to the entity.”325
It is hard to know what to make of this criticism.  It is not
at all clear what Pietrusiak means by “directly” assisting cli-
ents, as that is not the rubric employed by the Restatements or
the courts.  Nor does he explain the difference between “estab-
lished” and other (“unestablished”?) laws.  It is true that law-
yers have long been exposed to liability for assisting their
clients’ frauds, particularly in securities cases, but that liability
has not turned on whether the fraud was serious enough to be a
crime as well as a tort.  And it is hardly a “radical expansion” of
the law to hold that aiding and abetting liability can be imposed
324. Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 216-17.
325. Id. at 217-18 (footnote omitted).
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on persons whose conduct is not independently actionable; that
is its raison d’etre.  Finally, it mocks the seriousness of breaches
of fiduciary duty to suggest that they arise when fiduciaries
have done nothing more than “mak[e] less favorable decisions
than he or she might have . . . .”326
More to the point here, Pietrusiak fears that if lawyers are
exposed to aiding and abetting liability, “a lawyer would be lia-
ble for conduct that constitutes indirect assistance of a policy
decision that at worst, was unwise.”327  But no court would im-
pose liability on a lawyer (or anyone else, for that matter) for
aiding and abetting a “policy” decision that was merely “un-
wise.”  It is only when those decisions are legally actionable—
either because they amount to a breach of fiduciary duty or be-
cause they are tortious or otherwise legally wrongful—that the
principal wrongdoer can be found liable.  And unless the law-
yer’s client is civilly liable to someone, there can be no aiding
and abetting liability.328
Pietrusiak recommends that “the consequences of such a
radical theory strongly point toward limiting aiding-and-abet-
ting liability to its traditional contours and holding that a law-
yer should be held liable only for knowingly and substantially
aiding and abetting illegal conduct.”329  The problem is that he
never explains what he means by “illegal.”  Why are torts such
as fraud “illegal” while breaches of fiduciary duty are not?  Is
there a principled basis for saying that a breach of fiduciary
duty is “illegal” if the fiduciary is a trustee but not if he or she is
some other kind of fiduciary?  Pietrusiak doesn’t say.
Professor Hazard, by contrast, grappled directly with this
issue, pointing out that it is not possible to decide whether and
when lawyers ought to be permitted to aid and abet illegal con-
duct without confronting the question of what is meant by the
word “illegal.”330  Citing section 348 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Agency, he suggested that lawyers ought to be liable for
326. Id. at 218.
327. Id. at 217.
328. There is one other fallacy in Pietrusiak’s assertion.  No lawyer (or anyone
else, for that matter) can be liable for aiding and abetting without providing “sub-
stantial” assistance.  It would take quite a bit of “indirect” assistance to satisfy this
standard.
329. See Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 259 (emphasis added).
330. See Hazard, supra note 153, at 672-79.
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knowing involvement in fraudulent transactions.331  But beyond
this, he came to no definitive conclusions about where to draw
the line.332
The Model Rules, for their part, draw a clear but unex-
plained line.  Rule 1.2 bars lawyers from counseling or assisting
clients in “conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent
. . . .”333  The problem is that the drafters did not make clear the
purpose of this limitation.334  Professors Hazard and Hodes sug-
gest that by barring lawyers only from participation in criminal
or fraudulent conduct, Rule 1.2 implicitly permits them to assist
non-fraudulent tortious conduct without ethical sanction.335
This proviso is critical, however, as Hazard and Hodes are quick
to add that the civil liability of the lawyer is a separate
matter.336
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,
likewise, would limit lawyer discipline for aiding and abetting
to situations involving client crime or fraud, while also pointing
out that discipline and civil liability are different processes that
do not necessarily produce parallel outcomes.337  The few pub-
lished cases involving attorney discipline for aiding and abet-
ting civil misconduct generally involve client fraud, although
there are at least hints that broader condemnation is possi-
331. Id. at 679.
332. Professor Hazard titled his seminal article How Far May a Lawyer Go in
Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?  However, because he was writing
in 1981, before the explosion of civil aiding and abetting suits, he had little case
law with which to work and was forced to limit his focus to exploring the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of lawyers’ civil aiding and abetting liability, and (very
presciently) roughing out the analytical framework.
333. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983).
334. See Pepper, supra note 142, at 1591 (“[T]he line drawn for the purposes
of lawyer discipline is the civil/criminal line, with a little jog in the line to take in
fraudulent conduct.  This may be because fraud is enough ‘like’ crime to cross the
line.  Or it may be that the line derives from the drafters’ notion of the malum in
se/malum prohibitum distinction, with fraud being like crimes in general, morally
wrong in itself.”).
335. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 308, § 5.14.
336. Id.
337. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(2) cmt. c
(2000). See also Daniel L. Draisen, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Their Relationship to Legal Malpractice Actions: A Practical Approach to the Use of
the Rules, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 67 (1997); Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics
Rules are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 929 (2007).
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ble.338  Moreover, the regulatory process involves more than just
attorney disciplinary bodies and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, for example, has disciplined lawyers practicing
before it for their role in aiding and abetting securities fraud.339
Lawyers may also, of course, be found guilty of criminal aiding
and abetting charges.340
Accordingly, at the end of the day, there is no readily ap-
parent principled basis on which courts can grant lawyers a
“privilege” to aid and abet their clients’ breaches of fiduciary
duty without creating serious inconsistencies between those
cases and the well-established lines of cases recognizing that
such liability exists in the other two situations in which lawyers
are most often sued for aiding and abetting—fraud and breach
of trust.
B. Other Inconsistencies
Insulating lawyers from civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting creates a second type of inconsistency that ought to be
briefly noted—one that involves the fates of non-lawyers who
are involved in misconduct in which a lawyer is the principal
wrongdoer.
No one appears to dispute that non-lawyers are not privi-
leged to aid and abet the wrongdoing of a lawyer.341  Why then
338. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pak, 929 A.2d 546 (Md. 2007)
(attorney disciplined for aiding her parents in their efforts to defraud creditors in
real estate and related corporate transactions); Grievance Adm’r v. Rostash, 577
N.W.2d 452 (Mich. 1998) (attorney disciplined for his role in assisting prosecutor
in violating public trust); In re Konnor, 694 N.W.2d 376 (Wis. 2005) (attorney disci-
plined in part for his role in aiding and facilitating a trustee’s breach of trust). See
also Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Attorney for
Aiding or Assisting Another Person in Unauthorized Practice of Law, 41 A.L.R. 4th
361 (1985).
339. See Langevoort, supra note 31, at 82 (“With respect to securities practice,
the SEC authorizes the disbarment of lawyers practicing before it who are guilty of
irresponsible professional behavior.”); Steinberg, supra note 57, at 11-17 (discuss-
ing various SEC regulatory prosecutions against lawyers).
340. See, e.g., Gormley v. Patton, No. 07-CV-92-HRW, 2007 WL 2460946 (E.D.
Ky. Aug. 24, 2007). See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of
Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1998).
341. See, e.g., Lerner v. Fleet Bank, 459 F.3d 273, 287-88 (2d Cir. 2006); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Equity Fin. Group, 537 F. Supp. 2d 677, 699
(D.N.J. 2008); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. CV-00-20905, 2007
WL 3284060, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2007); Alleco Inc. v. Harry & Jeanette Wein-
berg Found., 665 A.2d 1038, 1050 (Md. 1995).
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should it be different when the shoe is on the other foot?  No one
has said.  Along the same lines, how should the law handle the
persons involved in a civil conspiracy with a lawyer?  Aiding
and abetting (here used in its strict, technical sense) and civil
conspiracy are two branches of the same tree, so there is no ob-
vious reason to exempt lawyers from liability for aiding and
abetting, but not from liability for civil conspiracy.  But if the
non-liability of lawyers is extended to civil conspiracies, the re-
sult will be that when a group of people, one of whom is a law-
yer, engage in a civil conspiracy, all of the conspirators will be
fully liable for the acts of their co-conspirators, while the lawyer
will not be liable for anything!  The courts have, understanda-
bly, declined to reach this absurd result.342
IV. Aiding and Abetting Claims Against Lawyers
Can Be Handled Within the Existing Legal Framework
Permitting lawyers to be sued for aiding and abetting their
clients’ breaches of fiduciary duty (or other wrongdoing) does
not mean exposing them to unlimited liability.  Lawyers still
have near complete immunity to liability for their conduct dur-
ing litigation, and what little liability they do have in that
arena comes from traditional causes of action like malicious
prosecution, not theories of aiding and abetting.343  Like other
agents, lawyers are generally free to assist their clients’
breaches of contract without sanction.344  Lawyers also have the
benefit of all of the usual procedural devices available to civil
defendants.  Thus, when aiding and abetting claims are filed
against lawyers, the courts can be depended on to dispose of the
meritless ones on motion.345
In addition to these protections, others are built into the
two main theories of liability set forth in the Restatement (Sec-
342. See, e.g, Noel v. Hall, No. CIV. 99-649-AS, 2000 WL 251709 (D. Or. Jan.
18, 2000) (declining to dismiss civil conspiracy claims against attorney); Kurker v.
Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of civil
conspiracy complaint against attorneys but not other alleged conspirators);
Likover v. Sunflower Terrace II, Ltd., 696 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App. 1985) (affirming
judgment against attorney for participating in a civil conspiracy).
343. See supra note 220; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERS §§ 56-57 (2000); HAZARD & HODES, supra note 308, at 4-40.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 151-57.
345. See cases cited supra note 11 and infra notes 348 & 371.
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ond) of Torts—section 876(a) (civil conspiracy) and section
876(b) (substantial assistance, or “aiding and abetting”).346
A. Civil Conspiracy (Section 876(a))
Lawyers have little reason to fear their exposure to liability
for civil conspiracies.  First, with the arguable exception of Cali-
fornia, such claims are generally far less common than substan-
tial assistance claims under section 876(b).  Moreover, liability
under section 876(a) attaches only to those who are engaged in
tortious conduct.347  This makes it difficult to impose civil con-
spiracy liability in breach of fiduciary duty situations, because
it is typically only the fiduciary who owes direct duties to the
injured third party.
In addition, any case in which a third party alleges that a
lawyer conspired with his or her client carries the potential for
summary dismissal on the basis of what is often referred to as
the “agent’s immunity rule.”  This generally-accepted principle
holds that agents are not legally capable of conspiring with
their principals, and it has often been used to dismiss civil con-
spiracy claims against lawyers who have done nothing other
than provide routine legal services.348  While California may be
346. In this section, I shall revert to using “aiding and abetting” in its techni-
cally correct sense to refer only to cases arising under section 876(b).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. c (1979).
348. See, e.g., Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297,
313 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal of conspiracy claim against lawyers
because “an entity cannot conspire with one who acts as its agent”); Michigan Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 128 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923-25 (E.D. Va. 2000) (granting attorneys’
motion to dismiss civil conspiracy claim absent allegation of willful or malicious
conduct); Heffernan v. Hunter, No. Civ. A. 97-6041, 1998 WL 633694, at *5, n.4
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 1998) (“Limiting attorney-client conspiracies to those in which
the attorney is acting for his sole personal benefit is consistent with federal law
regarding conspiracies between corporate agents and their principals.”); Astarte,
Inc. v. Pacific Indus. Sys., 865 F. Supp. 693, 708 (D. Colo. 1994) (“An attorney,
being an agent of his principal, cannot be held liable for conspiracy with his princi-
pal where the agent acts within the scope of his authority and do [sic] not rise to
the level of active participation in a fraud.”); Doctors’ Co. v. Super. Ct., 775 P.2d
508, 510-14 (Cal. 1989); Fischer v. Estate of Flax, 816 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 2003)
(“[T]here can be no ‘conspiracy’ with a client if an attorney merely acts within the
scope of his employment as an advisor to, or an advocate on behalf of, the client.”);
Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (“[T]here can
be no conspiracy where an attorney’s advice or advocacy is for the benefit of his
client and not for the attorney’s sole personal benefit.”); Roth v. La Societe
Anonyme Turbomeca France, 120 S.W.3d 764, 778 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (“Because
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a special case as a result of the Wolfrich decision and the bevy of
conspiracy cases against lawyers that it spawned, even Califor-
nia lawyers appear to have little to worry about.  The Doctors’
Co. decision reiterated the “agent-immunity” rule in civil con-
spiracy cases and left lawyers (and everyone else) exposed to
civil conspiracy claims only when they owe an independent duty
to the person harmed or when they stand to benefit financially
from the conspiracy.349
B. Substantial Assistance (Section 876(b))
Most of the concerns that have been expressed about law-
yer liability for “aiding and abetting” focus on section 876(b)-
type claims, which obligate a plaintiff to show that a lawyer
knowingly gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the
wrongdoing of his or her client.350  The basic issues under sec-
tion 876(b) are thus two: what did the lawyer know, and what
did the lawyer do?
1. Knowledge
Section 876(b) applies to those who “know[ingly]” give sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to someone engaged in a
breach of duty to a third person.351  A comment to section 874 of
an attorney is an alter ego of his or her client, a conspiracy between the attorney
and client usually is not possible.   If, however, an attorney, serving his or her own
interest, acts outside the scope of an agency relationship, or if he or she, rather
than the client, commits fraud or another intentional tort during the course of his
or her representation, the attorney may be liable for conspiracy.”) (citations omit-
ted).  Other courts acknowledge the rule but apply it in a way that appears to leave
more room for liability. See, e.g., Transtexas Gas Corp. v. Stanley, 881 F. Supp.
268, 270-71 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (Notwithstanding the rule against principal/agent
conspiracies, “Texas appellate courts have held attorneys liable for conspiring with
their clients to commit torts against third-parties.”); Blatt v. Green, Rose, Kahn &
Piotrkowski, 456 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing conspiracy
claim against lawyer for his role in conspiracy to violate Florida Probate Code);
Celano v. Frederick, 203 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (recognizing civil con-
spiracy claim against attorneys); Badger Cab Co. v. Soule, 492 N.W.2d 375, 381
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (“[A]n attorney may not use the license to practice law as a
shield to protect himself/herself from the consequences of participating in an un-
lawful or illegal conspiracy.”). See also Martin H. Pritikin, Toward Coherence in
Civil Conspiracy Law: A Proposal to Abolish the Agent’s Immunity Rule, 84 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (2005).
349. See Doctors’ Co., 775 P.2d at 510-14.
350. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
351. Id.
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts confirms that the same limi-
tation applies to claims for aiding and abetting a breach of fidu-
ciary duty.352  The text of section 326 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts uses slightly different phrasing, referring to
anyone who participates when he or she “has notice that the
trustee is committing a breach of trust.”353  However, a com-
ment to that section uses the terms “knowledge” and “knowing,”
and there is no reason to believe that it establishes a materially
different standard.354
While there is some disagreement among the courts on the
subject, there is considerable authority for the proposition that
constructive knowledge is sufficient to satisfy this standard.355
Offsetting this principle is the general consensus that the
amount of required knowledge varies inversely with the level of
assistance provided.356  Thus, doubts about the extent of a law-
yer’s knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct he or she is
assisting are most likely to be resolved against him or her in
those cases in which the assistance or encouragement was most
substantial.
Critics of aiding and abetting liability for lawyers neverthe-
less complain that the knowledge requirement is vague and
does not provide lawyers with sufficient guidance on their expo-
sure to liability—without making more than a passing effort to
suggest why this is a bigger problem for lawyers than it is for
everyone else.357  It is surely true that lawyers know more than
non-lawyers about the law and that they are (or should be at
least) better able than non-lawyers to spot any incipient torts or
352. Id. § 874 & cmt. c (“A person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in com-
mitting a breach of trust is himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to
liability for the harm thereby caused.”) (emphasis added).
353. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 326 (1959).
354. Id. cmt. a.
355. Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 309-10 (Colo. App. 1994) (noting split in
authorities); Witzman v. Lehrman, Lehrman & Flom, 601 N.W.2d 179, 188 (Minn.
1999) (discussing split in authorities); Chem-Age Indus. v. Glover, 652 N.W.2d
756, 775 (S.D. 2002) (holding constructive knowledge sufficient); Barksdale, supra
note 96, at 567 & n.137 (collecting cases going both ways).
356. Chem-Age Indus., 652 N.W.2d at 775. See also Witzman, 601 N.W.2d at
188; Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by
Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 25-26 (1993);
Richmond, supra note 96, at 133.
357. Barksdale, supra note 96, at 567-73; Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 235-37.
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breaches of fiduciary duty that they may be on the verge of as-
sisting.358  But it is not at all clear why this is a reason to protect
lawyers, as those most able to see liability coming ought to be in
the best position to avoid it.  Moreover, this is hardly the only
arena in which lawyers are subject to vague or even arguably
inconsistent “knowledge” requirements.359
Finally, the criticism of aiding and abetting liability is hot-
test when a third party claims that a lawyer has assisted his or
her client’s breach of fiduciary duty.  However, lawyers advising
fiduciaries typically do not have to worry about misreading
their clients’ intent, since the liability of fiduciaries typically
does not depend on their state of mind.360
2. Substantial Assistance
The basics of the “substantial assistance” requirement are
well-settled.  The Restatement suggests five factors for courts to
consider in making this assessment: “ ‘the nature of the act en-
couraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his
presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the
other [tortfeasor] and his state of mind.’”361  To these five fac-
tors, the Halberstam court added a sixth: the duration of the
assistance provided.362  It is clear that the conduct of the aider
and abettor need not be tortious or independently wrongful for
358. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51
cmt. h (2000) (“A lawyer is usually so situated as to have special opportunity to
observe whether the fiduciary is complying with [fiduciary] obligations.”); Pietru-
siak, supra note 7, at 256 (“Lawyers’ position in society, and their collective legal
expertise, suggest that they should ‘know better’ than to aid in another’s breach of
fiduciary duties.”).
359. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51
cmt. h (2000) (explaining the knowledge requirement in connection with the duties
imposed by section 51(4)); John P. Freeman & Nathan M. Crystal, Scienter in Pro-
fessional Liability Cases, 42 S.C. L. REV. 783 (1991); W. William Hodes, The Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer’s Code: Sur-
prisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 808 (1981) (canvassing the
various provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct relating to a law-
yer’s knowledge, and concluding that “it is hard to find a consistent and principled
theory at work . . . .”).
360. Tuttle, supra note 61, at 901.
361. Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979)).
362. Id. at 484.
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liability to attach.363  There is a proximate cause component, as
liability depends on a showing, not just that the assistance was
“substantial,” but that it was “a substantial factor in causing
the resulting tort.”364
Those who have problems with lawyers’ liability under sec-
tion 876(b) have for the most part focused on two issues.
i. The “Duties” to Speak and Monitor
An argument frequently made against allowing substantial
assistance liability for lawyers is that it forces them to stick
their (presumably unwanted) noses into their clients’ busi-
ness—to speak when their advice is not sought, to actively mon-
itor their client’s behavior, or perhaps to intervene to prevent a
client from committing a tort or some other form of wrongdoing.
The Oregon Court of Appeals expressed this concern in
Granewich,365 and it has been echoed by other courts and legal
commentators.366  Indeed, two commentators constructed an en-
tire article around the argument that exposing lawyers to aid-
ing and abetting liability improperly forces them to speak or act
to prevent their clients from doing something wrong.367  These
concerns are understandable but vastly overblown.
363. Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 794-95 (Or. 1999).  This, of course,
is the whole point of the difference between section 876(b) (in which the aider and
abettor’s conduct need not be independently wrongful) and section 876(c) (in which
independently tortious conduct is necessary). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876(b), (c) (1979).
364. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d. See also In re Welding
Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 775, 807 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Clausen v.
Carroll, 684 N.E.2d 167, 171-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Pruitt v. Bowers, 499 S.E.2d
250, 252-53 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); McNulty & Hanson, supra note 356, at 43; Pietru-
siak, supra note 7, at 234.
365. Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1074 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)
(“[A]doption of the dissent’s proposed rule [permitting aiding and abetting liabil-
ity] will require that the attorney anticipate client response to his advice and mon-
itor the client’s subsequent actions in order to avoid personal liability.”).
366. See, e.g., Durham v. Guest, 171 P.3d 756, 761 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (ex-
pressing concern that lawyers exposed to aiding and abetting liability for their role
in representing a client in a dispute “would have to monitor the case during the
representation in order to evaluate the ongoing risk of liability”); Pietrusiak, supra
note 7, at 218 (fretting that lawyers exposed to aiding and abetting liability “would
now be obliged to second-guess every policy that may pose a potential breach of
fiduciary duty”).
367. McNulty & Hanson, supra note 356.
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To begin with, lawyers have long been authorized to dis-
close even client confidences to prevent imminent death or seri-
ous bodily harm.368  More relevant here, the trend is clearly in
the direction of authorizing lawyers to disclose privileged com-
munications when they suspect that their client plans a crime
or fraud.369  Moreover, why is it reasonable to assume that cli-
ents do not want their lawyers to speak up when they have rea-
son to believe that they (the clients) are about to act in a way
that will expose them (as well as perhaps their lawyer) to civil
liability?  Isn’t the opposite assumption more reasonable?
Lawyers who fear that a client might expose them to liabil-
ity by ignoring their advice against legally dubious (but not
criminal or fraudulent) conduct, or “twist[ ] [that advice] to suit
an unfair aim,”370 can protect themselves by documenting their
advice.  Lawyers seem to be born knowing how to do that!
Any residual fear that aiding and abetting liability imposes
an uncabined duty on lawyers to babysit their clients evapo-
rates entirely when one studies the cases.  For example, the
cases involving lawyers that McNulty and Hanson cite in sup-
port of their argument against liability for aiding and abetting
by “silence or inaction” almost all reject such liability.371  And
even if it should happen that there are rare situations in which
lawyers are held liable for failing to monitor a client’s conduct
or to intervene to prevent harm to the client or others, it would
368. CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 170, at 101.
369. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)-(3) (1983).
370. Richmond, supra note 96, at 131.
371. McNulty & Hanson, supra note 356, at 26-28. See Camp v. Dema, 948
F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of
lawyer on claim of aiding and abetting securities fraud even though “[h]e transmit-
ted documents, contacted the title insurance company, and had the needed waivers
and other documents signed”); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991)
(affirming dismissal of aiding and abetting claims against lawyers based on their
alleged silence and failure to disclose their clients’ securities fraud); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming
grant of summary judgment in favor of law firm based on silence and inaction).
The court, in S.E.C. v. National Student Marketing Corp., did recognize the viabil-
ity of claims against lawyers for aiding and abetting securities fraud based on si-
lence and inaction, but the precedential and persuasive value of that case is
dubious in light of the subsequent rejection of such liability by three courts of ap-
peal, as well as the Supreme Court’s Central Bank decision rejecting aiding and
abetting liability in most federal securities fraud claims.  457 F. Supp. 682, 712-14
(D.D.C. 1978).
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only leave them in a situation comparable to that of many other
professionals.372
Stanley Pietrusiak also argues that aiding and abetting lia-
bility imposes on lawyers an unfounded duty to monitor a cli-
ent’s conduct or to intervene to prevent harm.373  The problem is
that in making this argument, he confuses aiding and abetting
liability with the principles that govern lawyers’ duties to orga-
nizational clients.374  The extent of a corporate lawyer’s duty to
“go up the ladder” or otherwise blow the whistle on apparent
wrongdoing by constituents of a corporation or other entity was
thrust into prominence by the savings and loan cases and has
been the subject of impassioned debate ever since.375  But that is
an issue of the scope of a lawyer’s duty to his or her own client, a
very different proposition from the lawyer’s liability to a third
party for aiding and abetting that client’s wrongdoing.376
Bryan Barksdale compounds the confusion by citing Pietru-
siak’s article for the proposition that “numerous courts have
taken the position that one may be liable for aiding and abet-
ting the breach of fiduciary duty by inaction or failing to pre-
vent the breach, ignoring the general rule that nonfeasance
does not amount to tortious conduct.”377  There are two big er-
rors here.  First, Pietrusiak acknowledges that the cases he
cites actually demonstrate that “courts have struggled to deter-
mine when a person may be liable for nonfeasance.”378  In fact,
372. See, e.g., Patricia C. Kussman, Annotation, Liability of Doctor, Psychia-
trist or Psychologist for Failure to Take Steps to Prevent Patient’s Suicide, 81
A.L.R. 5th 167 (2000).
373. Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 216-17, 237-39.
374. Id. at 216-17 (criticizing aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty as
an “ominous new form of attorney liability” that arose out of a number of cases in
the late 1980s “that read the terms of Rule 1.13 [of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct] broadly by holding that attorneys may be liable for not taking remedial
action to prevent their clients’ representatives from engaging in illegal acts.”) (foot-
note omitted).
375. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1983); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 (2000); George C. Harris, Taking the
Entity Theory Seriously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organiza-
tional Clients Through Disclosure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 597 (1998).
376. The same distinction would also need to be made between aiding and
abetting liability, and liability based on the affirmative duties imposed on lawyers
by section 51(4) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS.
377. Barksdale, supra note 96, at 575 (citing Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 238).
378. Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 238.
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to the extent that a trend is discernible, it appears to be that
nonfeasance is not enough to support aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, whether a lawyer is involved or not.379  Second, it is irrele-
vant whether nonfeasance is or is not tortious, because the
conduct of an aider and abettor need not be wrongful for there
to be liability under section 876(b).380
ii. Advice Alone
A second fear of those who would reject or limit liability for
substantial assistance or encouragement is that lawyers will be
held liable for “simply giving bad advice.”381  In Granewich, for
example, the Oregon Court of Appeals worried that “[t]he giving
of professional advice will be ‘chilled’ by the knowledge that lia-
bility could result to those outside the professional relationship
. . . .”382  It is most definitely true that section 876(b) applies to
anyone who knows that the conduct of another constitutes a
breach of duty “and gives substantial assistance or encourage-
ment to the other so to conduct himself.”383  And a comment to
that section confirms the drafters’ intent that physical assis-
tance is not necessary to establish substantial assistance; ad-
vice alone is sufficient.384
Here too, however, it is hard to find actual cases giving law-
yers reason to fear that they will be hit with liability for doing
nothing more than giving sound legal advice.  Indeed, one com-
mentator states flatly that “[t]here are no reported cases of civil
or criminal liability on the part of the lawyer, or of professional
discipline, clearly based only upon providing the client with ac-
curate legal information.”385  Certainly none of the three leading
cases that reject the aiding and abetting of lawyers (Reynolds,
Alpert, and Durham) fall into this category.
379. In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 775, 807 n.143
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (collecting cases).
380. See supra note 363.
381. Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 217.
382. Granewich v. Harding, 945 P.2d 1067, 1074 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
383. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979) (emphasis added).
384. Id. § 876 cmt. d (“Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral
support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the
same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical
assistance.”).
385. Pepper, supra note 142, at 1548; see also id. at 1593-98.
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Nevertheless, it would be disingenuous to argue that there
is no chance that a court would ever find a lawyer guilty of aid-
ing and abetting on the basis of his or her advice alone.  At least
two commentators have recently attempted to explore the
problems that lawyers face when they are asked to advise cli-
ents who are operating at the edge of the law.386  Though in both
instances the commentators’ focus was far broader than civil li-
ability for aiding and abetting, neither concluded that lawyers
should not be exposed to such liability.  If anything, they appear
to suggest the opposite.387
But there is one very important thing to remember about
aiding and abetting claims that might be brought against law-
yers by third parties based solely on advice that the lawyer gave
to his or her client: it is difficult to imagine how such a case
could arise without the involvement of the lawyer’s client.  If all
a lawyer did was give his client advice, a third party would ordi-
narily have no way of even knowing that the advice was given,
much less what it was, unless the lawyer’s client put it at issue
by, for example, raising an advice of counsel defense.  Thus, the
lawyer’s advice is likely to come to light only when it was bad—
when he or she incorrectly counseled a client that a particular
course of conduct was permissible.
And if a lawyer was found liable to a third party solely on
the basis of advice that he or she gave to a client, it would
hardly be the first time something like that ever happened to a
professional.388  Nor would it necessarily be the least bit unfair.
Consider for instance, whether there would (or should) have
been any difference in the outcome in Moore v. Shaw if attorney
Shaw, instead of preparing the agreements by which George
Moore breached his fiduciary duty by terminating his mother’s
trust early, had told him that she was too busy to prepare the
documents and had instead explained how he could draft them
himself, that George had followed Shaw’s advice in preparing
386. See Joel S. Newman, Legal Advice Toward Illegal Ends, 28 U. RICH. L.
REV. 287 (1994); Pepper, supra note 142.
387. Newman, supra note 386, at 312.
388. See, e.g., Francisco v. Manson, Jackson & Kane, Inc., 377 N.W.2d 313
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming judgment against architect for injuries suffered by
ten-year-old boy in fall from diving platform that architect had recommended to
the boy’s school).
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the documents, and that the bank had accepted the documents
he drafted and terminated the trust.
IV. Conclusion
The last twenty-five years have witnessed the rapid trans-
formation of two of the common law’s sleepier streams—civil
aiding and abetting liability and the general civil liability of
lawyers—into raging rivers.  One would expect to find turbu-
lence at the intersection of these developments, and it is surely
to be expected that courts tossed into the maelstrom would have
difficulty getting their bearings.  But the fact that errors are
predictable does not mean that they need not be identified and
corrected.
Because there were, until recently, few decisions seeking to
impose civil aiding and abetting liability on lawyers, it is not
surprising that courts confronted with such cases would view
them as presenting the question of whether to recognize a
brand new cause of action against lawyers.  So posed, the ques-
tion looks entirely different than it does when framed as it
should be—whether lawyers should be exempted from a cause
of action that applies to everyone else.
It has been argued that the decisions in Reynolds and Al-
pert should be applauded because “an attorney should not be
held liable merely for doing his job”389 and that exposing law-
yers to civil aiding and abetting liability is a bad idea because
“[w]hile the lawyer has wide discretion in matters of tactical
considerations and technical expertise, the lawyer is bound to
follow the client’s wishes regarding the overall goals of the rep-
resentation.  In short, as an advocate, the lawyer is hired to
zealously execute the client’s directives, not to second-guess
them.”390  As Professors Hazard and Hodes point out, senti-
ments like these reflect the mistaken belief “that the lawyer’s
duty is one of unconditional loyalty to the client, a loyalty that
leaves no room for concern for anyone else.”391  But a lawyer’s
loyalty to his or her client was never meant to be blind.  Law-
yers must represent their clients “zealously [but] within the
389. Palvino, supra note 96, at 53.
390. Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 261 (footnotes omitted).
391. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 308, at 4-32.
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bounds of the law”—a critical limitation that leaves plenty of
room for aiding and abetting liability.392
There are now, in 2008, many cases holding lawyers civilly
liable for aiding and abetting their clients’ misconduct, and
there is precious little evidence that such decisions have inhib-
ited lawyers from providing necessary legal services.  In the
area in which lawyers traditionally faced the most serious expo-
sure to aiding and abetting liability (securities fraud), the
courts were able to work through the issues raised by that the-
ory of liability without driving lawyers away from providing le-
gal services.393  The existing structure of aiding and abetting
law provides lawyers with much protection, and it is worth re-
membering that civil aiding and abetting suits will be adjudi-
cated by judges, who can surely be trusted to understand and be
sensitive to the predicament of lawyer defendants.
Such judicial sensitivity must have limits.  The quote set
out at the beginning of this article was, obviously, intended to
highlight what I see as the most troubling aspect of the Reyn-
olds, Alpert and Durham decisions: the fact that they are sure
to be perceived—correctly—as granting lawyers special protec-
tion from civil liability.  The “widespread public hostility toward
lawyers and the legal profession” has been well-documented
and thoroughly aired, and there is no need to rehash it here.394
It is, however, worth pointing out that the Reynolds court’s un-
fortunate use of the term “privilege” to describe the protection
that it granted lawyers, and lawyers alone, is, in this environ-
ment, especially dangerous.  It is one thing to say that particu-
lar conduct is “privileged,” but it is something else entirely to
say that a particular profession is “privileged” in a way that
others are not.  Those who believe that the call to the bar is so
important that lawyers must be insulated from liability to
which everyone else is exposed would do well to recall George
Orwell’s parable about what happens when those in a position
to make the rules decide to grant themselves special
“privileges.”
392. Id.
393. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 31, at 84-89.
394. Pietrusiak, supra note 7, at 219 (footnote omitted).
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